Q&A: Analyze, Accept, and Adapt to Polling Place Security Risks

In a democracy, the biggest day is Election Day. Citizens vote to determine the course the country will take and its leadership until the next round of elections. By the end of 2024, an estimated 83 elections will have been held around the world, with billions of voters casting ballots.

In 2024 in the United States, Election Day is 5 November. And while every registered citizen of voting age is welcome to cast his or her vote, polling places—schools, churches, and libraries—are often soft targets with a unique set of risks.

“Everything that’s great about (Election Day) makes it a huge target day as well,” says Jennifer Hesterman, author of Soft Target Hardening: Protecting People from Attack.

Security Management chatted with Hesterman, a security consultant and (ret) U.S. Air Force colonel, to learn more about why polling places in the United States are at risk and considerations for soft targets’ security during these periods.

This interview has been edited for clarity and length.

Security Management (SM). First and foremost, why is polling place security a topic that’s of interest to you?

Jennifer Hesterman. This was a while back, but when my daughter was in elementary school, her school was a polling place. There was also a church on the property. It was a pretty contentious election cycle. They had school that day. They also had a funeral at the church, and they had the polling place open.

From a security and a safety standpoint, there were just people everywhere. The streets in this area are clogged anyway. From a pedestrian standpoint, the queuing, the funeral, the school, I just thought, “what’s going on? How are they keeping people from intermingling?” This is a while back, before soft targets and before ISIS started hitting civilian places. As a security person, the co-location of these three things at one time was concerning. It’s always been in the back of my mind.

Why can’t we think out of the box on this? It’s very traditional. I think it’s very Americana. People love Election Day. You’ve always gone to cast your vote at the community center and you’re getting coffee and doughnuts. It’s like this whole experience of going to the polls. In 2024, we have to rethink that experience and balance the security threats with all of that.

Jennifer Hesterman shares how organizations can harden soft targets without turning off potential customers or patrons, with concentric rings of security out from the front door to the Internet. Listen in: https://t.co/nOB0Ks86ox pic.twitter.com/o5Wc6UjExU

— Security Management (@SecMgmtMag) April 21, 2024

SM. What is it about the 2024 elections that has you saying, “We need to rethink this?”

Hesterman. First, the American public is angry. They’re acting out. We see it all the time. People just can’t contain their anger, so it really concerns me. Also, the tenor of everything. There’s a hostile undertone due to the divisive election climate that we’re in again, like we had four years ago. I think even more so now.

It’s only a small percentage that are hostile and divisive. Ninety-eight percent of America, they’re going to go to the polls to cast their vote. But there’s that small percentage that maybe they’re either going to try to convert you to their way or they’re going to try to eliminate you or stop you from voting, possibly. That’s the percentage that’s concerning.

If two people get into an argument, I feel like it could escalate quickly in a confined space with a lot of people around. Sometimes a local police officer or patrol car may be present, which is a good deterrent, but these are polling places, and we don’t want it to look like a prison.

It’s this rub that we have with all soft targets—convenience, the experience, and then security. How do you balance these three things? Do we make it hard for people to get in, or do we make it an enjoyable experience? Just roll the dice that day and hope nothing happens? That’s unconscionable. When I talk to these places, I say, “If somebody gets hurt on your property or killed on your property on Election Day, there’s going to be a lawsuit.”

Someone like me is going to come in and start asking a lot of hard questions about “how did you protect these people? If you knew there was a vulnerability or risk, why didn’t you cover that? Why didn’t you just say ‘I don’t want to be a polling place’ if you were concerned?”

I’m going to ask a lot of hard questions about this. They need to think about it ahead of time. How are they protecting people on their property?

SM. Are you saying that if you are running a polling place, you should assume that you are a target?

Hesterman. I hate to say that, but yes, they should assume that they’re a target. If they’re usually at schools, churches, and community centers—which are three of the biggest soft targets because people are so vulnerable—they usually don’t have money to protect them properly.

The polling place itself is vulnerable because it’s a symbolic target. It’s like a super target now, where a bad actor would be like, “This is great.” Even though they may not be targeting the polling place itself, it could just be a bad actor that’s looking for the most vulnerable place to hit. It’s just this huge concern.

It’s this rub that we have with all soft targets—convenience, the experience, and then security. How do you balance these three things?

SM. You mentioned de-escalation earlier. How can that kind of training help in these situations?

Hesterman. If they recognize someone’s about to spill over, or a situation where people are arguing, and they know how to properly intervene in that and just cool things off, get the tempers to stop flaring, then they could get out ahead of it and possibly prevent something from happening. There are ways to do that. I work for a company that does verbal de-escalation training and verbal judo. That’s one technique. I would say those are valuable skills.

There are so many vulnerabilities that I say look for the most vulnerable thing. If they cover that, they’ve just raised their level of security a lot. I try to get people to focus on the one thing that makes you vulnerable.

For every polling place, that’s different. Maybe it’s on a busy street corner. We now have people driving into crowds, whether it’s careless or distracted drivers or a malicious person. They have to protect the queues, the lines of people, people in the parking lot that are just hanging out talking. It’s tough because they’re probably not thinking about it or ready to address it.

Another approach is layered defense, like pushing fences out and barricades out to try to put some protection between the perimeter and the people.

A lot of times people think security starts at the front door. You have to push it out into the parking lot, the streets, the community. Thinking about what you want to protect and putting it in the middle of this circle and layers of defense. If the bad actor thinks something’s going to get in the way of what they’re trying to do, they’ll be deterred. They’ll probably go somewhere else.

The biggest deterrent is actually a human. Greeters in the parking lot or by the barricades on the streets can engage with people. A threat actor doesn’t want anyone to get in their way and ask questions, interfering with their plan. Polling places have volunteers that could be out there, but they have to know what they’re looking for to be empowered to ask these questions like, “why someone is here?” and “what’s in the bag?”

Signage works, too. They could have signs saying bags are not allowed in the polling area or directing people so they’re just not hanging out. You want them to vote and move along. There’s a way to facilitate that activity where people are getting off the property as fast as possible.

Sara Mosqueda is associate editor for Security Management. Connect with her via LinkedIn or send her an email at [email protected].