Essential Security Strategies to Mitigate the Threat of Chemical Attacks at Large Events
The United States is no stranger to major national and international sporting events, attended by tens of thousands of fans, with millions more watching the live action around the world. While focused on the enjoyment of the games, few are aware of the extensive security operations that must take place before, during, and after these events to keep everyone safe from terrorist or criminal attacks.
Looking ahead to 2026, the United States will host a variety of sporting events, including the FIFA World Cup soccer event (co-hosted with Canada and Mexico), the 2026 Special Olympics USA Games, the NBA and WNBA All-Star games, Super Bowl LVI, and the 2026 World Series. Millions of people will travel from all corners of the country—and from across the world—to watch their teams compete.
The large number of attendees at stadiums and sports tracks puts significant stress on security operations, especially with the higher risk of lone wolf or terrorist attacks amidst today’s geopolitical uncertainty. A major sporting event is a tempting target for attackers, not only because of the large number of people in a crowded environment, but because of the immediate global attention an attack would draw. Security operations at these events can therefore never afford to relax or make assumptions, regardless of how unlikely an attack scenario may seem.
While mass shooter events or bombings are known threats every security company tries to prepare for, the potential for a chemical attack, while unlikely, cannot be discounted, given the current global political, social, and economic instability. For threat actors looking to gain publicity for their cause, a chemical attack will attract the most exposure because it would automatically be labeled as a strike by a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). This attack method would attract a media frenzy due to the enormous number of unknowns in terms of fallout and subsequent harm to civilians.
Naturally, security companies can’t employ teams to cater to each unique type of attack, which means security personnel must consider all possible strikes and know how to adapt when something happens. Ideally, all fans, employees, teams, and workers at these venues would undergo security screening, but the sheer number of people involved makes this difficult. Nevertheless, ignoring security screening is not an option; it must be handled in a manner that secures all events and attendees from any manner of attack, while still minimizing any disruption to the fan experience. The screening process must begin well in advance of the event and continue until the last spectator or team member has departed.
Chemical agent attacks can often be the easiest to carry out since event security is more focused on preventing traditional weapons from entering venues—like firearms and knives. Dangerous chemicals are rarely top of mind, despite being easy to produce and conceal.
Most people view chemical agents as complex material that has to be made in a lab under strict conditions and with specific equipment. This may be valid for military-scale agents, but anyone with the motivation and a little knowledge can create a deadly weapon. In March 2025, an Arkansas man was sentenced to eight years in federal prison for producing jars of ricin (a restricted biotoxin, which is waste left over from castor oil extraction) on his property. Chemicals, which are available in bulk at many retailers nationwide, can easily be converted into chemical agents in someone’s basement with minimal specialized equipment required.
For any threat actor, smuggling chemical agents into a stadium is a relatively straightforward process. If the agent is stored in a sealed container, such as a water flask or soft drink bottle, it is nearly impossible to detect it, even with canine support or the most advanced technology. The attack method can often only be accurately identified once it has been deployed, and this is where the risk and threat is.
Minimizing the Risk
Effective management of chemical threats requires a comprehensive strategy that encompasses prevention, detection, planning, response, and recovery. This multifaceted strategy integrates different elements, including understanding the risks, developing a defensive policy, resource allocation, advanced technology, specialized expertise, and coordinated planning and collaboration between private and public entities.
Security managers, for instance, should establish layers of security to screen and check those entering the premises, including suppliers, workers, team members, fans, and vehicles and cargo. Each layer should include trained security staff and technology.
The screening process must begin well in advance of the event and continue until the last spectator or team member has departed.
The first external layer should have a mechanism to randomly search vehicles and people entering the venue. Guards should conduct a visual search, while technology screens for chemical agents hidden among supplies. The external layer should screen at least 20 percent of the vehicles, adjusting this number according to traffic volumes, the specific event, and risk priorities.
The second layer consists of similar processes, randomly screening people and supplies to identify the same threats, but it is located between the first layer and the stadium. Again, screening everyone is impossible, but by using people, technology, and proven best-practice processes, security screening can focus on identifying high-risk individuals and suppliers to screen.
Security guards in the first two layers should have access to and be trained in the effective use of presumptive analysis tools. These instruments can scan a substance, even if it is contained in clear packaging, to determine its chemical makeup, whether it is a liquid or powder. Other instruments can detect trace elements in the air, which could indicate the hidden presence of hazardous substances.
The third layer—or inner layer—is the stadium or venue itself where thousands of people will gather and where the attack would have the optimal impact. Some people make a common error by assuming that this third layer is safe because people have passed through two layers of screening to enter it. This assumption is incorrect and poses an extreme risk. Security should always assume at least one bad actor has made it through the screening layers.
Instead, preparation to protect this layer from chemical agent attacks should commence at least two weeks before the event when security operatives determine the baseline, or “normal” status of the area. The baseline can be measured using instruments that collect air samples and provide a breakdown of the “natural” levels of chemicals in the venue.
Air sample measurements should be taken throughout the duration of the event, either by roaming security personnel or autonomous instruments located in strategic areas and compared to the baseline in the command center. If any dangerous airborne molecules appear or the density of a substance suddenly spike, it could indicate a potential threat, and response plans can be initiated.
The command center is the epicenter of securing a sporting event. Everything feeds into this center, including communications, surveillance camera feeds, covert reports from undercover workers, as well as external information, such as social media reports, about potential threats. As strange as it seems, weather reports are also vital and play an important role in mitigating chemical attack risks.
Chemical agents are gases that are driven by the wind. In the event of an attack, the control room must, if possible, be located upwind to ensure that security operations can continue throughout the emergency, safe from contamination. Additionally, upwind escape routes for civilians must be prepared in advance to ensure safe evacuation.
Zones of operation for casualties and first responders must be part of the security preparations. In response to a chemical attack, the impacted regions are categorized into three zones: hot, warm, and cold. These zones differ from the three security screening layers.
The hot zone is where the attack occurred and represents the most hazardous area. Individuals in this area have been injured by the attack and might still be at risk. This zone must be securely contained, and only response teams with the proper protective equipment should enter. The warm zone is adjacent to the hot zone and serves as the area where first responders gather to prepare, retrieve rescue gear, and provide emergency treatment to casualties. The cold zone encompasses all regions beyond the warm and hot zones where people are safe.
The Human Factor
Despite the prevalence of technology to assist in security operations, humans remain the primary security resource that sporting events depend on. Knowing how to deal with people, what to look for, how to react and collaborate to manage an emergency is critical.
Large-scale event security companies often rely on freelance contractors to ensure they have enough feet on the ground. It is important that even these contract security personnel be trained to an appropriate level so—if needed—they know how to reliably use the technical instruments that collect air samples or conduct presumptive analysis of unknown substances.
“Under-employment” is another human risk. Even if a smart, well-trained person is given routine, repetitive tasks for hours on end, they will lose focus and their mind will wander. Task rotation can mitigate this risk, allowing an individual to work on one task for about an hour before being rotated to another task. A regular change in routine avoids complacency and boredom, keeping security personnel engaged, active, and “present” in the situation.
For any threat actor, smuggling chemical agents into a stadium is a relatively straightforward process.
Unfortunately, no plan to secure a large event with thousands of people present can ever be 100 percent secure. A worst-case scenario plan must therefore be in place, and the security team must rehearse it. A clear chain of command is vital, even if multiple security companies are involved. The team leaders should be in the command center, where they have access to all necessary information and redundant communication capabilities.
The key to planning an effective response to a chemical attack is to anticipate emergency incidents by including various attack variables, such as time, location, and the potential chemical agents that could be used. Security responses should be carefully planned and rehearsed, involving all personnel on the ground. Naturally, the security plans must include law enforcement and other state and federal government agencies to ensure an integrated, seamless response.
Core Components of Event Security
Setting up the three security screening layers is the first step in securing an event; however, screening operations should be conducted both overtly and covertly. Overt operations rely on visible guards in uniforms with instruments in hand to not only screen people, vehicles and supplies, but to be seen doing it. The knowledge that screening is happening can often be a sufficient deterrent for some people.
Undercover operators should also conduct covert screening, blending in with the public and patrolling the location, swiping surfaces, testing air samples, and monitoring for suspicious activity. The key is to cover as much of the potential attack area as possible without making the event a bad experience for spectators.
On the day of an event, there is no time to send a suspicious substance to a laboratory for analysis. Therefore, having access to presumptive analysis instruments to scan samples in seconds is critical. If a chemical agent is detected, the command center can launch the planned response, personal protective equipment can be dispersed, and preparations to treat casualties and evacuate the stadium can be made.
While large-scale chemical attacks targeting sporting events have not occurred to date, the potential risk remains, and private security companies must be proactive in their emergency preparedness. A multifaceted strategy that includes enhanced collaboration among private security services, law enforcement, emergency services, and event organizers is critical to ensure effective communication and rapid response capabilities.
Experienced and trained security personnel are an integral component of this approach, empowering them to recognize warning signs and respond swiftly to any chemical attack incident. Effective planning enhances the safety of attendees, workers, and athletes, minimizes the potential impact of an attack, and ensures that everyone enjoys the event.
Jeff Brodeur, Phd, is the vertical market manager for safety and security at Rigaku Analytical Devices. He has experience developing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) strategy, plans, and training programs at all echelons of the U.S. Department of Defense from a strategic, operational, and tactical perspective. Brodeur was formally trained at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. His past performance includes senior battle staff roles at the Army Division (2-star), Army Service Component (3-star), and Geographic Combatant Command (4-star). Brodeur's last military duty assignment was the assistant commandant for the U.S. Army Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear schoolhouse and Regimental headquarters, where he expertly managed the professional military education curriculum, training, and administrative management of an annual student load of approximately 8,000. Brodeur has a Doctorate from Colorado Technical University and is an internationally recognized CBRN expert with conference keynote speaker and panel member experience in Canada, Iraq, Sweden, and the United States. Contact him at [email protected]
© Jeffrey M. Brodeur
