On a highway near Acatlan de Juarez, Jalisco state, Mexico, a truck passes by a burned bus and car, allegedly set on fire by organized crime groups in response to an operation to arrest cartel kingpin Nemesio "El Mencho" Oseguera on 22 February 2026. Gunmen retaliating for the raid blocked more than 20 roads in western Jalisco state with burning cars and trucks. (Photo by Ulises RUIZ / AFP via Getty Images)

Mexican Security Forces on High Alert After Death of Cartel Kingpin ‘El Mencho’

By Claire Meyer

23 February 2026

Mexican security forces killed Nemosio Oseguera Cervantes, a powerful cartel boss known as El Mencho, on 22 February during a government operation to capture him. Cartel members have retaliated sharply, setting up roadblocks, burning vehicles, and launching attacks nationwide.

Oseguera led the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (known by the Spanish language acronym CJNG), which is one of Mexico’s dominant drug-trafficking organizations. The group has been battling other cartels and moving cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl into the United States and other countries since it split off from the Sinaloa Cartel in 2009.

CJNG also takes in billions of dollars a year through a diverse range of criminal activity—not just drugs but extortion, fuel theft, kidnapping, illegal logging and mining, and migrant smuggling. The group conducts public executions, publicizes violence on social media, and assassinates Mexican politicians, judges, and law enforcement officers, The New York Times repo rted.

Oseguera himself was a former police officer who rose through the ranks of the Sinaloa cartel in the 1990s before founding CJNG. He quickly gained a reputation for being a ruthless kingpin who attacked security forces in Mexico. But international law enforcement has been focused on his activities and the cartel at large for years. For instance, the U.S. State Department had offered a $15 million award for information leading to Oseguera’s arrest.

“Over the past year and a half, the net had been closing in on El Mencho,” wrote El País. “On the one hand, in September 2024, the U.S. justice system sentenced Rubén Oseguera González, alias El Menchito, El Mencho’s son, to life imprisonment for drug trafficking and carrying firearms. In August 2025, in one of the largest mass extraditions of drug lords, Mexico sent one of his old partners, Abigael González, alias El Cuini, the alleged financial mastermind of the criminal group, to the United States. And a month later, the [U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration] announced that it had arrested 670 alleged members of the cartel who were in the U.S. in just one week.”

The operation on 22 February was planned and executed by Mexican Special Forces, supported by bilateral cooperation with the United States, which provided intelligence information, the Mexican Ministry of Defense confirmed today. The mission in Tapalpa, Jalisco, was designed to detain Oseguera, but military personnel were attacked during the raid, leading to a shootout. As a result, seven CJNG members were killed, including Oseguera, and three soldiers were wounded.

Oseguera's death kicked off a wave of retaliatory violence across multiple Mexican states. Armed groups blocked roads, attacked security forces, and set fire to businesses and vehicles. Across Mexico, authorities identified 250 blockades in 20 states. At least 25 National Guard members have been killed so far in the attacks, according to Mexico’s secretary of security and citizen protection, Omar García Harfuch.

In response to the violence, Mexico deployed 2,500 reinforcement troops. School was canceled in several states. The national trucking association urged drivers to seek shelter. The state of Jalisco suspended public transportation in some areas and instructed hotels to have their guests stay inside. The resort city of Puerto Vallarta has been hard hit, with video obtained by CNN showing multiple fires burning and plumes of smoke rising.

The U.S. State Department issued a shelter-in-place warning for U.S. citizens in the states of Jalisco, Tamaulipas, and some areas of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Nuevo León. Other countries—including Argentina, France, Germany, India, The Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and Ukraine—urged their citizens in Mexico to take extreme precautions and stay inside.

The conflict—and potential for a long-term, unstable power vacuum within the cartels—escalates security concerns for the upcoming World Cup, part of which will be played in Estadio Akron stadium in Guadalajara.

“It all brings to the forefront long-simmering questions about what authorities will do to make sure fans are safe and this summer’s tournament goes off without incident in Mexico,” The Guardian repo rted. “The idea that a World Cup match in this soccer-loving country would be targeted is something that has concerned political officials, soccer directors, and fans for decades.”

State officials in Jalisco said last year that they plan to add thousands of security cameras, purchase new law-enforcement vehicles, and use counter-drone technology to enhance security around World Cup venues, partly in response to cartel activity concerns.

So, how will this situation affect corporate security? To explore the possibilities, Security Management caught up via email with John Rodriguez, founder of Empathic Security Cultures, LLC. Rodriguez has more than 35 years of experience in Latin America corporate security functions, including with Cardinal Health, Kimberly-Clark, and Levi Strauss & Co.

Security Management (SM). How have similar situations played out in the past, such as the El Chapo arrest or other cartel disruptions? Is this likely to be similar, in your opinion?

John Rodriguez. Looking back to recent history, when President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006 and launched Operación Michoacán, he fundamentally changed the landscape of the Mexican Drug War with this “Kingpin Strategy.” At the start of his term, the drug trade was controlled by basically five organizations: the Sinaloa Cartel (the Federation with the Beltrán-Leyva brothers), the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo), the Tijuana Cartel (Arellano-Félix Organization), the Juárez Cartel (Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization), and La Familia Michoacana. Although the campaign was successful in ways, by the end of Calderon’s term in 2012, the most impactful and challenging result was the splintering of these organizations that have been operating since then. The potential now exists for another phase of splintering.

SM. How could a cartel power vacuum affect corporate and national security in Mexico and the surrounding area?

Rodriguez. At this time, there are more questions than answers. The successor or successors to fill the vacuum should occur relatively soon, though some of the main questions will be:

Will the [CJNG] decide to retaliate against the government and to what extent, or will they attempt to return to business as usual with those inherent risks?
Will the Mexican government decide to do more law enforcement actions on that cartel and/or others? Or de-escalate to attempt to stabilize the country?
Will the Mexican government collaborate with other countries on intelligence and other areas? If yes, will that collaboration be held confidential or announced to the public?

SM. How could this situation potentially affect business travelers and expats? Are they likely to be targeted?

Rodriguez. Historically, business travelers and expats have not been targeted by the major organized crime groups, and their main risks have been general street crime situations, which certainly could be life-threatening (a street robbery that results in a victim’s injury or death, for example), or sexual assault—and these incidents can occur in any country. However, these risks could change as one of the retaliatory strategies by organized crime.

SM. What can organizations do to maintain operations and operational intelligence during this tumultuous period?

Rodriguez. This is where the seasoned internal security professionals, mature security programs, and a company’s security culture will provide the best risk mitigation.

This crisis will not be resolved in a short time and is one more crisis (albeit a very major one) for security professionals that have years of experience and wisdom leading comprehensive risk-based security programs.

This event and its fallout will bring senior business leadership and security leaders in even closer collaboration for those best-in-class security programs and may be a challenge for the companies that have not invested in their security programs or security professionals and are just now prioritizing their crisis management perspectives.

For those companies that have inadequate security programs, senior security leaders have the opportunity to protect their people and business operations by seeking diverse (beware of echo chambers and biases) and seasoned business, security, and government perspectives and resources.

Security resources since the abovementioned 2006 government action have accelerated and positively developed in areas of open-source intelligence, speed of information/intelligence, security networking and relationships, technology, and security associations (ASIS, OSAC, and Mexican security associations).

Lastly, for CSOs not based in Mexico but that have a security team there—many security professionals are already at their maximum physical and mental capacity, and I recommend you prioritize the care and support they may need to be successful. Being empathic, supportive, and realistic regarding the challenges and stressors the in-country team is experiencing will be impactful and long-lasting…even long-lasting to the extent of retaining your top talent on your team depending on how you supported them.