Reexamining the Physical Security Failures in Bourbon Street Attack
Scrutiny of the tragic vehicle ramming attack on New Year’s celebration revelers on Bourbon Street in New Orleans continues, and The Washington Post performed a detailed examination of the physical security failures at the scene.
“The overarching recommendation from Interfor was to make most of the thoroughfares within the French Quarter pedestrian-only… because they are pedestrian-only during all the festivals and Mardi Gras events and parades,” Don Aviv, CPP, PCI, PSP, CEO of Interfor International, told Security Management in the days after the incident. His firm, Interfor, had conducted a physical security assessment of the area for the city’s French Quarter Management District. “They should be [pedestrian-only] 24/7 because that’s the only way to stop this and protect pedestrians.”
Aviv also helped the Post with its examination, telling them, “There were a number of ways to successfully protect this street from a ramming attack, and it appears that none of them were used.”
It has been widely reported that the street has a retracting bollard system that was in the process of being replaced. The reason cited in these reports is that the system did not function well because Mardi Gras beads would fall into the machinery and disrupt its ability to raise and lower. Aviv reported to Security Management and in a Wall Street Journal opinion piece that there have also been different explanations for why the bollard system was not in regular use, including inadequate staffing to raise and lower the bollards as needed for delivery or other commercial vehicles.
In lieu of functioning bollards, the New Orleans Police Department parked police vehicles at Bourbon Street intersections to block traffic, leading New Orleans Police Superintendent Anne Kirkpatrick to say at a news conference after the incident that “We did indeed harden those targets.”
However, the effectiveness of the terrorist attack and the ease with which the attacker bypassed security measures showed that the site hardening was poorly executed.
The Post’s analysis starts with the police vehicle attempting to act as a barricade. Using video and photo sources from the scene on the day of the incident, the Post determined that the barricading police vehicle had moved at least somewhat throughout the day. At one point the police SUV was positioned in a way that left a 14-foot gap. The article embeds surveillance video of the truck starting the attack, easily skirting around the barrier vehicle, although the gap it went through was smaller than 14 feet.
Using Google Earth imagery, the Post shows the location of a heavy wedge barricade that spanned the street two or three dozen feet from the point where the attacker avoided the police vehicle. However, the wedge was down, providing no impediment to the attack.
“The wedge barrier should have been up. It would likely have stopped the assailant,” Aviv tells Security Management. “I have heard conflicting reports as to why the barrier was down, ranging from reports that it was broken to reports that it was down to allow for emergency vehicles through. Ultimately, we will need to wait for the official reporting.”
Beyond the wedge, the only impediments put in place were lightweight fencing segments—the type of contraption that is approximately 8 feet long and looks like a bicycle rack. Such barriers can be moved easily by a single person, and indeed, the Post presents video from the evening showing that most of these had been moved aside. However, even in place, the fencing is no match for a speeding pickup truck. The truck did strike one of these fences and dragged it along as it continued speeding down the street.
From the inactive wedge barrier, the attacker drove at high speed along the pedestrian-filled street for almost three blocks before crashing into a piece of construction equipment that was parked along one side of the street.
The Post article also has video that the attacker filmed using Meta glasses when he apparently was doing reconnaissance on the site. The video is from 31 October, another time when Bourbon Street would be expected to be filled with Halloween celebrations. The reconnaissance makes this attack somewhat unusual, Aviv tells Security Management.
“Vehicular ramming attacks are typically opportunistic and not well-planned,” he says. “They are one of the easiest forms of terrorism to carry out—anyone who can drive a car can become a terrorist. This is precisely why there have been over 200 violent ramming attacks in the past 25 years around the world. There is not much evidence historically that assailants scouted their routes prior to their attacks.”
He noted that the attacker had been in the military, which could explain his extra preparation. He said discovering that someone is doing such surveillance is hard, if not impossible, if they do not share their plans with others.
“As most security professionals would agree, identifying someone that is scouting a location such as Bourbon Street is nearly impossible to detect,” Aviv says. “Tourists routinely walk around with cameras. Therefore, the only way to truly protect against such attacks is to harden the areas to mitigate the possibility of a vehicle penetrating a pedestrian area.”
Source: FBI
The attack killed 14 people, injured at least 57 others, and police shot and killed the attacker. At least one lawsuit against the City of New Orleans has been filed, claiming the attack was preventable. At least one other law firm has also said it intends to investigate the role played by the city, the city’s police department, and others, claiming the attack was “foreseeable and preventable.”
