Security
Business Practices Reference

7

Professional practices for security managers seeking to improve security within their organizations

ASIS Council on Business Practices

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Benefit from the Experience of Colleagues

Sir Isaac Newton said, "If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." Like-wise, you—the security professional—can benefit from studying the work of your security colleagues. By collecting examples of specific, successful experiments in security problem solving, this document will help you build on your colleagues' experiences, standing on their shoulders and seeing further, as you look to solve security challenges in your own enterprise.

What You Will Find

Through actual case studies, the authors present a problem that occurred, the response taken to correct that problem, and the results achieved when the response was implemented. In some cases, the solution provided measurable results, which are depicted in a chart or graph. Contact information is included with each case so you can communicate with the author directly to learn more about the cited problem or solution.

How to Use This Book

To gain the most from *Security Business Practices Reference, Volume 7*, begin with a review of the table of contents. The case studies are divided into six core topics, which replicate the domains used in the Certified Protection Professional (CPP) designation. The topics are defined broadly, and often cases could fit in more than one topic area.

Acknowledgments

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Note: The business practices presented in this book reflect the good faith efforts and actions of security practitioners. The publisher does not certify their reliability.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Retail	60	300,000

A Public-Private Partnership for Emergency Preparedness

The Problem

The Security Department for Great Lakes Crossing (GLC) shopping center wanted to enhance its relationship with emergency response agencies in Auburn Hills, Michigan. GLC, located in Oakland County north of Detroit, is an upscale, premier property sitting in one the wealthiest counties in the nation and serving a population of over 3 million. This tourist destination and retail location with 12 to 14 million visitors a year is owned by Taubman Centers. It is common for businesses, especially high-profile ones, to want to enhance their relationship with police, fire, emergency medical services, and other agencies that provide crucial emergency response services to their business, employees, customers, and visitors. Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, more organizations across the nation are developing partnerships to jointly mitigate the impact of critical incidents (business disruptions) and develop new resources and response protocols.

The Response

In 2003 the GLC Security Department participated in the CIP (Critical Incident Protocol) Community Facilitation Program. The program is funded by the Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, through a grant awarded to Michigan State University's School of Criminal Justice. The program consists of joint public/private sector emergency planning sessions facilitated by MSU and culminates in a tabletop exercise that highlights joint emergency response issues. The CIP Program enhances partnerships between a jurisdiction's public safety agencies and the business community for joint emergency preparedness, planning, and prevention, including preparation for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.

The GLC security director and mall staff incorporated the CIP partnership model into their security and management culture to create a larger network of sources and resources and to enhance decision-making and planning.

The Outcome

Through the CIP Program the security department created stronger relationships not only with city departments but also with county, state, and federal agencies. Because of the stronger relationships, the security director was invited to sit on public-sector committees and workgroups regarding such topics as grant allocation and hazard mitigation. In addition, the grant made it possible for security personnel to be issued pager-like devices that alert for radioactivity, such as that from a dirty bomb. Also, through a federal target-hardening program, GLC and the City of Auburn Hills will obtain an expensive, sophisticated machine that analyzes unknown powders "within an hour" for anthrax and other dangerous compounds. In the next few months, through a governmental critical infrastructure risk assessment program, GLC will receive a base radio to communicate instantly and directly with county emergency responders.

The partnership started with joint training between GLC and city fire, police, and EMS agencies. The first joint training session provided by the fire department was on the incident command system (ICS) for GLC. In addition, the GLC Security Department has facilitated tabletop exercises with city and other public agencies. Currently, GLC is looking at its business continuity processes through a partnership with the nearby community college. GLC's commitment to the public-private partnership has inspired other high-profile and large employers to follow its lead. Finally, the Security Department's partnership program reaches out across Oakland County into the greater Detroit metropolitan area and southeastern Michigan.

For more on the CIP Community Facilitation Program, please visit www.cip.msu.edu. To learn more about Great

Lakes Crossing, go to www.shopgreatlakescrossing.com.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Commercial High-Rise Real Estate and Property Management	650+	$8.2 billion

Fire Alarm Reduction Initiative

The Problem

Fire alarms, both legitimate and false, are extremely disruptive to commercial high-rise building residents. Because fires have the potential to harm people and destroy property, it is essential to respond to them swiftly. Nuisance alarms, however, disrupt the workplace, reduce faith in the fire alarm system, and cause people to delay exiting when an actual fire occurs. Also, fire alarms can create havoc with the building heating, venting, and air conditioning system, causing considerable discomfort on tenants and wear and tear on various building systems. In addition, fire crews called to nuisance alarms are taken away from responding to legitimate alarms.

A property management company overseeing a large amount of commercial space in downtown Calgary began to investigate the number of nuisance alarms in its three downtown office towers. Coincidentally, at the same time, the Calgary Fire Department started to explore the idea of fining for nuisance alarms. That development provided an extra incentive to reduce the number of fire alarms the buildings were experiencing.

The Response

To understand the scope of the issue, the management company first had to measure it. In fall 2003, all fire alarm data from January 1, 2002, forward were plotted on a matrix. Three categories of alarms were created—legitimate, illegitimate, and unknown—and all alarms were plotted accordingly. The legitimate alarms were divided into two subcategories: external and internal. Illegitimate alarms were divided into four subcategories: user error, system malfunction, work done without notification, and damage to the system.

After a careful plotting of all alarms into the matrix, a number of patterns surfaced. First, it was obvious that alarms were activating for different reasons. Therefore, an effort to reduce the overall number of alarms would need to incorporate several strategies at the same time. Second, commonalities among some alarms in all three high-rise office towers under the firm's management suggested that a standard approach would work in some cases. For example, incidents in the "damage to the system" category shared similar causes: sprinkler heads were destroyed by inattentive contractors conducting demolition or tenants ignoring height restrictions in the underground parking lots. Third, some alarm causes were specific to particular buildings, indicating that building-specific actions would be required. Finally, the number of unknown alarms dropped dramatically, as every alarm was thoroughly investigated.

Analysis of the legitimate alarms indicated that vandalism was a problem specific to one building only, as 11 alarms occurred there and nowhere else. Another cause of legitimate alarms was tenant activity (mainly insufficient care in cooking, such as burning toast or popcorn). The remaining 22 alarms were caused by equipment failures, such as burned-out fan bearings or overheated air conditioning units.

Illegitimate alarms were caused by poor communication between various building users, such as contractors, operators, and repair technicians. Illegitimate alarms were also caused by activities originally not thought to cause alarms (and thus not requiring portions of the fire alarm system to be deactivated), such as painting, parking area sweeping, or equipment cleaning. A further problem was the staff's lack of familiarity with the fire alarm system.

In response, several strategies were developed. First, building management wrote letters to over 1,000 tenants and contractors, informing them of an initiative to reduce the number of alarms. An explanation of the causes of alarms was provided, along with a description of the fines that the fire department was now imposing on nuisance alarms. If it was determined that either a tenant or a contractor had created the alarm, that party would be responsible for paying the fine. Everyone was strongly encouraged to pay attention to any and all activities that could cause a fire and act accordingly.

Next, building management developed a pamphlet for contractors working in the buildings. A list of all activities that could potentially affect the fire alarm system was provided. In addition, security and operations staff were given more discretionary power over contractors and were encouraged to ask more questions than previously. Another tactic was to increase the level of communication between various departments, contractors, and tenants to ensure that everyone understood the impact of building operations on the fire alarm system. Finally, fire system training increased for security and operations personnel to ensure that everyone was thoroughly familiar with the fire alarm system. Workers were also encouraged to pay more attention during demolition work to ensure that sprinkler heads were not knocked off.

The Outcome

In 2002 the buildings had experienced 51 alarms, and 60 alarms occurred in 2003. Based on that 18 percent increase, the anticipation was that there would be a similar increase in 2004. With 35 alarms in all three buildings during the first six months of 2004, it looked as if the buildings were on track for that increase.

As the comprehensive fire alarm reduction strategy took several months to implement, it also took some time to take effect. Nevertheless, by December 31, 2004, there had been just 53 alarms instead of the anticipated 70, a substantial reduction in the number of alarms compared to the preceding year. While higher than the number of alarms experienced in 2002, these 53 alarms represented a reversal of the upward trend and indicated the success of the initiative. While building management continues to monitor both legitimate and illegitimate alarms, early indications are that alarms can be controlled to some extent through a concerted effort by all building residents.

Year	2002	2003	2004
# of Incidents	51	60	53
Percentage	100%	118% of 2002	88% of 2003

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Electric and Gas Utility	11,048	7,900,000,000

Reducing Cycle Time for Background Screening

The Problem

A merger of two companies occurred in 2000. Background screening had been performed in only one of the companies but was adopted as a company-wide policy after the merger. At the time, the average number of days to complete a background check was 14. Because the process was new to half the company, questions were raised as to why the process took so long. The lengthy background checks were causing hiring delays that led to operational problems.

The Response

The background check process was examined through a problem-solving tool that was part of the company's management system. Root causes of the problem were identified, and an action plan was put in place to improve the cycle time of the background checks. The following actions were taken:

· The components of the check were validated.

· The questionnaire was simplified.

· Internal administrative processes were streamlined.

· A request for proposal (RFP) was issued, and a new vendor was selected. The contract specified both cost and completion time.

· The number of screening elements was reduced.

The Outcome

After two years, the average number of days per background check dropped from 14 to 5. The process was examined through the management tool a second time in 2004. That test validated the background check system changes and identified the drug portion of the background check as needing improvement. At this point, without removing components of the background check or significantly improving turnaround time on high school diplomas and certain county criminal records, the average screening time is unlikely to drop below 4.5 days.

Beside radically reducing the time for a background check, the RFP also had the effect of saving an average of $20 dollars per applicant. With an average of 3,500 background checks per year, the result is an annual savings of $70,000.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Commercial High-Rise Real Estate and Property Management	650+	8.2 billion

Undesirable Activities Reduction Initiative

The Problem

Located in Calgary, Alberta, Petro-Canada Centre is a Class AA, 2.1 million-square-foot, multi-tenanted, commercial, twin-towered high-rise complex. It is one of the most sought-after premises in the city. Like any large, modern, metropolitan city, Calgary includes persons who conduct undesired activities, often around downtown commercial office towers. Because of the complex's central location, it has frequently been the target of such activity. People have come to the building to sleep, drink alcohol, pass the time, panhandle, cause disturbances, occasionally harass visitors and tenants, vandalize areas, and leave graffiti. Tenants and other legitimate building users are from time to time bothered by this unwanted activity. It is important to underscore that it is not the people who are deemed undesirable but rather their activities.

The Response

To get a good understanding of the scope of the issue, security officers completed reports of undesirable incidents. People responsible for those incidents often passed through the main lobby entrances along with legitimate building users. In 2000, lobby information officers were stationed in the East and West Tower lobbies. Their primary duties were to greet tenants and visitors in the morning.

The lobby information officers served as a first line of defense against illegitimate users of the buildings. Because staff were assigned to the lobby areas permanently, they became familiar with daily building residents and other place users. Often, the illegitimate users were identified immediately and because of their histories or current behavior were asked to leave the building or were put on notice that certain of their activities were unacceptable.

In addition, patrol officers increased their presence in peak hours in the second-floor food court and ground-floor common areas. People found engaging in unwanted activities were immediately approached and warned to cease their behavior. That process helped establish the rules regarding acceptable and unacceptable behavior. People refusing to follow the rules were asked to leave and in some cases were escorted off the premises.

As part of an ongoing response to incidents, a review of building areas where illegitimate users were congregating was made in late 2003. In addition to their graffiti, vandalism, and drug and alcohol use, the illegitimate users were crowding the emergency stairwells, creating a hazard. Several of the areas they were using beneath emergency stairwell landings and adjacent to remote mechanical areas were subsequently walled off. In some cases, locking access panels were installed so that staff could reach mechanical equipment.

The Outcome

The number of incidents did not decline immediately. However, the security measures eventually paid off. As the following table shows, the site experienced 1,072 incidents in 2000. The year 2001 saw a 12 percent increase to 1,203 incidents. Reductions started in 2002 with a total of 792 incidents, a 24 percent decline from 2000. The number of incidents continued to shrink in 2003, which saw only 350 incidents, a 67 percent reduction from 2000's figure. In 2004 incidents rose slightly (to 393), but that figure nevertheless represented a 63 percent decrease from 2000. (See also the following graph.) In 2005, the initiative's sixth year of working to reduce undesirable activities and make the building more user-friendly for legitimate place users, it is evident that the number of incidents has dropped significantly since the program's inception.

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
# of Incidents	1,072	1,203	792	350	393
Percentage of Year 2000 Incidents	100%	112%	74%	33%	37%

Total by Year

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Higher Education (Student Housing)	9,833	100,000,000

False Fire Alarms

The Problem

The University of Miami is one of the largest private research universities in the southeastern United States. Approximately 4,200 students live on campus in five residential colleges and seven apartment buildings.

The problem of false and nuisance fire alarms in on-campus student housing is not unique to this campus. It is a major challenge for most university administrators across the country.

During the spring 2001 semester, the housing department collected data on fire alarms by having staff document the date, time, type (general or trouble), and cause of each alarm. At the end of the semester, data analysis showed a total of 63 general alarms during the semester. One startling revelation was that most of the alarms were due to system problems, such as smoke detectors in utility closets, in machine rooms, and on rooftops. In fact, 70 percent of alarms were set off by system deficiencies, not students. Up to that point, the prevailing thought was that students were responsible for most false fire alarms.

The Response

With this new information in hand, the physical plant department worked with the local fire department during summer 2001 and replaced many smoke detectors with heat detectors that still met fire and life safety codes. The continuing data collection showed that smoke detector replacement paid immediate dividends. In the fall 2001 semester, the number of alarms dropped to 29 from 63 the previous semester—a 54 percent reduction. The data also indicated that 20 of the 29 alarms (69 percent) were caused by students and the other 31 percent were due to system deficiencies. This was almost an 80 percent reduction in the number of alarms cause by system problems.

Data collection has continued (see graph and table). Between the fall 2002 and spring 2003 semesters, STI Stopper II covers were installed on all fire alarm pull boxes to reduce the number of alarms set off by that method. Also, a reward system was established to encourage others to step forward to identify individuals who triggered false fire alarms or tampered with fire and life safety devices like fire extinguishers.

Total General Alarms & Cause (Spring 2001-Fall 2004)

Semester	Total General Alarms	Alarms Caused by Students & Staff	Percentage Caused by Students & Staff
SPRING 2001	63	19	30%
FALL 2001	29	20	69%
SPRING 2002	34	25	74%
FALL 2002	46	35	76%
SPRING 2003	20	14	70%
FALL 2003	12	8	66%
SPRING 2004	25	13	52%
FALL 2004	28	21	75%

The Outcome

As the graph and table show, the problem of false alarms was not eliminated. However, simply removing smoke detectors from areas with a lot of dust has significantly reduced the number of alarms. Most false alarms are now caused by students, but they are mostly accidental, not malicious, resulting from burnt popcorn or steam from the shower. The focus has now shifted to fire safety education and awareness in an attempt to get students to understand how their everyday activities can trigger an alarm.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Residential/Commercial Real Estate and Property Management	250	11,200,000

Improving Vehicle and Pedestrian Safety

The Problem

Over the years, the south Florida luxury residential and club community of Williams Island had experienced dramatic growth. With the popularity of island residences and clubs came several thousand residents, members, contractors, visitors, and employees, who traveled the three-quarter-mile primary boulevard daily. Since the island was private property, the primary roadway was considered a private road and therefore not subject to traffic enforcement by the local police department. As a result, drivers on that boulevard were for all intents and purposes immune from any traffic enforcement. Given the lack of enforcement, many drivers disobeyed the multiple stop signs and speed limit signs, creating a public safety risk for both vehicles and pedestrians.

The Response

Island public safety management identified a state statute that permitted traffic control jurisdiction over private roads by a local police department. This statute and a city-produced agreement were promoted to the island property owners' association board of directors and to the developer as a partial remedy to the traffic safety issue. The city and island unanimously approved a traffic control jurisdiction agreement, which permitted traffic enforcement on the island's private road. The terms of the agreement allowed the city to keep any citation revenue and to enforce traffic laws on the island at any time. The agreement also defined terms whereby island management could request off-duty police beyond their routine patrols.

The Outcome

After warning residents and employees via multiple letters and posted memoranda, the local police department began traffic enforcement on the island. Over a period of three months, approximately 100 warnings were issued for traffic infractions. In the time since that unofficial grace period expired, over 200 moving violation tickets have been written. Although infractions have not ceased, they have notably declined.

As a point of interest, the vast majority of residents and employees were very pleased to see police traffic enforcement. Complaints regarding ticketing have been nearly nonexistent. Many people have noted that they would like the police department to conduct even more traffic enforcement.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Insurance	30,000	17,000,000,000

Making a Profit in a Proprietary Security Organization

The Problem

Every year it becomes increasingly difficult to fund security programs. More and more, corporations are looking for every division to justify its existence and reduce the drain on profit. Traditionally, security functions have been expense-based. To correct that situation and to gain an equal footing in the oraganization, the security department needs to become a profit center.

The Response

The construction of an entertainment, housing, and retail area adjacent to a major corporation's home office presented a perfect opportunity for the corporation's security department to offer security services to clients outside the parent company.

The department investigated state and local regulations regarding security providers and obtained a state license to provide services. The department then studied the market to learn what services were being provided and at what costs. The company's legal, financial, and human resources divisions then developed policy, procedures, and fiscal reporting strategies to address the security department's needs. The security department marketed its services with written material and many one-on-one meetings with prospective clients as they moved into the development area.

The Outcome

In 2004 the security department received $200,000 in outside income. In 2005 the department expects to generate a half million dollars in fees at a profit of 22 percent. The profit is used to offset the department's expense to the company.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Telecommunications	5,000	N/A

Personnel Security

The Problem
This problem was addressed at a 5,000-employee global telecommunications company for which the author previously worked. The company was a "new age" data corporation, not a telephone company. Senior management at the telecommunications company requested a recommendation on whether to implement preemployment drug screening.

The Response
The security director did not want to recommend drug testing simply because many other organizations were doing it. He felt any recommendation should be supported by the business case. Therefore, security staff led a cross-functional team consisting of security and human resource personnel to research the issue. The team conducted an in-depth business analysis that examined employee demographics, employee absenteeism, incidents of suspected drug use, warning signs of drug use in the workplace, workplace accident history, and the cost of preemployment drug screening.

The Outcome
The research produced the following data:

• The company's employees were primarily in white-collar, research and development, and high-tech positions, with very few traditional blue-collar positions. Most employees were college graduates who were cutting-edge thinkers in the data field.

• Employee absenteeism was very low.

• Research of available medical benefits data showed little or no usage that might be linked to substance abuse or abuse-related problems.

• The company had very few safety-sensitive positions. The company did not have trucks on the street or techs climbing poles.

• There were no incidents of suspected drug use on file.

• Adding drug screening to the hiring process would add $20 to $25 to the cost of each hire.

Based on the research results, there appeared to be little benefit to implementing preemployment drug screening. The security director recommended that the company not implement screening. However, the company did adopt a policy with provisions to conduct "for cause" testing and later modified the policy to require testing for employees working with laser technology or where mandated by customer requirements.

The recommendation was based on the business case for that particular company. The author's present company does screen for drugs. Each company should conduct its own research and take action based on the business case.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Retail Optical	27,000	2,200,000,000

Reducing and Preventing Missing Deposits

The Problem

Specialty retail stores that sell sunglasses and watches present unique challenges to the retail loss prevention executive. One such company has small in-line mall stores (200 square feet) and even smaller kiosks. Because those stores are usually staffed by one associate, two at the most, the associate working is rarely supervised.

The typical associate is 18 to 24 years of age. Annual turnover generally runs about 43 percent among managers and 87 percent among hourly associates. This environment is ripe for losses, and in these stores when money is missing it is almost always the whole deposit. Fifty-three percent of investigations involve some type of loss of cash and checks.

The Response

The company's regional loss prevention managers were given a goal to reduce missing deposits in fiscal 2004 in the stores for which they were responsible. In addition, the regional vice presidents of the company's operational zones were made aware of the goals and were informed that although sales were booming and profit was good, missing deposits were draining the bottom line.

A three-pronged approach was taken to reduce missing deposits: prevention, partnership, and investigation. To prevent missing deposits, the company instituted the use of a deposit slip validation log envelope. Each store manager is accountable for ensuring that every day's receipts from the register reading at the end of the day are written on the log along with the total of the deposit prepared and the variance, if any. The associate taking the deposit, which consists of cash and checks, to the bank signs the log in the appropriate column. Once the deposit is made, the bank provides the store with a validated deposit slip, which is returned to the store either by an associate or through the mail. The store manager then reviews the validated slips to ensure that the amount credited equals the intended deposit amount and the register receipts from that day. Deposit slips are inserted into the envelope part of the validation log. The manager signs off on the log, and the store's regional manager reviews and audits the log on every visit. Regional loss prevention managers also review and audit the log on every visit to the store.

The partnership aspect of the effort consists of agreements between the regional loss prevention managers and regional managers that every store's deposit slip validation log will be audited and signed on every visit without fail. Store associates and managers know that will happen. Any missing deposits will be detected. An additional partnership was established with the corporate Sales Audit Department. That department balances the stores' bank statements at set intervals, in some cases weekly or daily. As soon as the Sales Audit Department detects missing money or a missing deposit, it alerts the regional manager. If there is no response in seven days, the regional loss prevention manager begins an investigation.

Investigations begin with a review of the deposit slip validation log to audit its accuracy and determine what is missing. The Sales Audit Department provides 90 days' worth of accounting to compare. Next comes a visit to the bank to consult its overnight depository log to ensure that a deposit is not lost in the bank. The regional loss prevention manager also interviews bank associates who handle the store's deposits to gather facts and get a feel for any obvious bank problems before beginning to investigate the store associates responsible for making the deposits. The investigation often focuses on one associate whose name appears on the store's log with all the deposits missing. Sixty-eight percent of the missing-deposit cases involve the store's manager or assistant. Interviews take place, usually resulting in a confession. When no confession is made, the cases are referred to the local police department for further investigation.

The Outcome

The goal of a 25 percent reduction in missing deposits was easily made—in fact, it was exceeded. Over the last three years, this program saved the company over $500,000 in reduced losses. Without the prevention, partnership, and investigation approach, the company may have seen its deposit losses approach a million dollars. All restitution from the cases that were solved (96 percent of cases) went back into the individual store's profit-and-loss statement.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Healthcare	12,000	1,200,000,000

Security Screening with Customer Service

The Problem

In 2000 the New York Presbyterian Hospital-New York Weill Cornell Security Department initiated a program to increase its level of customer service to patients, visitors, and staff entering the hospital buildings. Because of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the initiative was changed to emphasize a more stringent lobby screening process, focusing more on protecting patients, visitors, and staff and less on maximizing customer service.

In 2002 the hospital administration wanted the 9/11 screening practice reevaluated, challenging the Security Department to increase customer satisfaction at the lobby entrances while developing a screening process less stringent then physical ID checks on all persons entering the hospital yet more stringent than pre-9/11 levels.

The Response

In 2002 the Security Department rose to the challenge of increasing customer service scores and changing the security screening process at entrances. The department set a goal of increasing its customer service scores by two percentage points per year while changing the way the department screened persons entering the facility.

To improve customer service, the Security Department began a customer service training initiative in concert with a similar effort taking place for all hospical employees at the same time. To improve the screening process, the Security Department decided to rely on a series of questions to establish an individual's authorization to enter and to slowly decrease the department's reliance on checking everyone's driver's license or other identification.

The Outcome

To reach its goals, the department felt it was important to combine customer service functions with the screening process. Security officers assigned to the lobbies would use their customer service skills to acknowledge individuals entering the hospital and then, through a series of questions, determine their authorization to enter. Once authorization was established, the officers would direct people to their destinations, enhancing security's customer service role.

The screening process selected for incorporation into the customer service initiative was the use of a series of questions designed to categorize persons entering the facility. The first category consisted of people who could articulate the exact location they were going to and the purpose of their visit. They were usually outpatients, clinic personnel, or employee visitors. These individuals were allowed to proceed once they were able to describe how to get to their destination. If they could not recite proper directions, directions were provided to them.

The next category consisted of vendors and contractors. These persons, once identified, were sent to a specific entrance where they were further screened and given a pass to enter the facility.

Next, inpatient visitors were identified. Depending on the hour of the day, they were authorized to enter after a brief identification process consisting of a series of questions verifying their right to visit.

Last, any people who could not articulate their purpose or name the location they were visiting were held off to the side until they could be questioned further. After questioning, they were either allowed to enter or escorted to the location they wished to visit for verification of authorization.

The Security Department's customer service/screening program was implemented in concert with a hospital-wide, generic customer service training program. The hospital supported that training program through continual media reinforcement, using posters, written material in existing hospital-wide print media, and a new customer service newsletter. The hospital also created incentives to reinforce each component of the customer service program.

The Security Department used its new employee orientation and its annual training program to implement the generic training portion of the initiative along with the screening initiative. Each Security Department training session was reinforced through printed media distributed at each post, through daily roll call announcements, and through continued reinforcement of the principles by the supervisors while the officers were on post.

The hospital-wide customer service program was designed to be implemented over a four-year period. A different aspect of the program would be introduced every six months. The Security Department incorporated specific aspects of its guest screening program into each component of the hospital's customer service program. During the first phase of the training, "Creating a Positive First Impression," the Security Department augmented the customer service program by outlining exactly where each officer should stand at each post when greeting guests. The screening program focused on body position in relation to traffic patterns entering and exiting each entrance. Officers were instructed to face incoming traffic and to make sure they blocked incomers, who would have to stop and be greeted. Officers were further instructed to wear proper uniforms and, of course, to smile.

During "Acknowledge, Apologize, and Amend," the second phase of the program, the Security Department introduced a detailed review of each type of person that enters each specific entrance and reviewed the entry rights for each person. For example, at one particular entrance, flower vendors are permitted to enter only after being announced and only from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. At all other times they may not make their deliveries and must be turned away.

When the hospital introduced its phase titled "Communicate Compassionately and Effectively," the Security Department introduced the officers to "scripting." Scripting is the use of a finite set of phrases or sentences by security officers as a standard greeting and for determining a guest's purpose for entering the facility. The idea of scripting is to provide greeting consistency across officers and shifts, thereby increasing customer service scores. Officers were asked to say, "Good morning [or other time of day], I'm Officer [name]. How can I help you today?" The scripted greeting continued to be used until the end of 2003 when scripting was expanded and used as a tool to restrict after-hours visitors.

In 2003 the hospital administration decided to end 24-hour visitation of inpatients. During the introduction of the phase titled "Protect Privacy and Confidentiality," scripting was used to present a series of questions to determine the necessity of visitation after hospital visiting hours. Questions were used to determine those persons who required off-hour visiting for medical reasons, such as a loved one whose medical condition was serious or life-threatening. During the hospital's fifth customer service initiative, "Treat Everyone with Respect," the Security Department trained security staff on scripted questioning of all persons entering the facility during all hours of the day. At that point, questioning replaced the practice of requesting positive identification. Positive identification is now only required when a person cannot articulate his or her purpose for coming to the hospital.

The last phase of the customer service training program was scheduled for 2005. During "Maintaining a Safe Environment," a review of the past four years will be conducted. Security staff will receive reinforcement on all aspects of the program introduced over the past four years. In addition, the program will reinforce the need to provide a safe and secure environment by properly screening persons as they enter the hospital.

The implementation of the customer service/screening initiative increased customer service scores and increased the level of security screening at the hospital lobbies. In addition, the Security Department found that questioning and categorization of persons sped visitors' entry into the hospital as compared to presenting positive ID. In the screening process, visitors are provided detailed directions on where to go. As a result of this initiative, the Security Department provides a higher level of security than it did in 2000 and has increased its customer service scores by an average of 1 percent per year.

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Industry	Employees	Yearly Revenues
Industrial	6,000	580,000,000

Workforce Protection Planning

The Problem

X-Y is the fictitious name of a large industrial enterprise settled throughout Spain. The company is organized into a national headquarters and several local production and administrative centers that are accountable to it.

A general survey on protection and security responsibilities and practices, conducted by a specialized consulting firm in 2001, revealed a situation characterized by decentralization, lack of coordination, and even duplication of efforts. The different protection functions and areas were divided as follow:

· Physical Security: reported to the deputy general director

· Environmental Protection: part of logistics management

· Workplace Safety: included fire fighting and was part of logistics management · Personnel Security: part of the Human Resources Department

· Medical Emergency and Biohazards: accountable to the general director of human resources

· Computer and Communications Security: was a function of the Information Technology Department but had no specific personnel assigned

· Operations Security: included in the policies and procedures of the Production Department but had no specific personnel assigned

The situation was the perfect scenario for the waste of protection funds, constant conflicts of interest and competencies, and employee dissatisfaction due to the patent perception that something was wrong with the protection and security function. X-Y management definitely felt uneasy about it.

The Response

The first step taken to solve the problem was the creation of a working group able to reach a solution in a given period of time: one month to settle the "big picture" in a realistic way and identify a strategy to follow. The working group included not only representatives of the protection and security functions involved, but also employees and even customers who agreed to participate.

At the project's time limit, a course of action was selected. It included the following steps:

· Adopt the term "Workforce Protection" to refer to all the areas of the company related to protection and security. The name was an attempt at conceptual integration.

· Develop a global, transparent, and understandable Workforce Protection policy and distribute it to the employees.

· Prepare a complete and general Workforce Protection Plan, a kind of steering plan, including the highlights and main aspects contained in all the specific protection and security plans, procedures, and protocols.

· Create one national and several local Workforce Protection committees (representing all the areas involved) to coordinate efforts and procedures in order to optimize economic resources. The main objective was to foster

interdepartmental communication.

· Identify a series of important, urgent, and visible protection challenges that could be addressed to gain early results.

The Outcome

After implementing those actions, the organization witnessed impressive results:

• Management realized an immediate saving of protection and security funds as expenses dropped 10 percent during the first year.

• The committee meetings (national and local) and the coordination activities effectively eliminated duplication and, consequently, waste of time and effort. A growing mutual knowledge facilitated collaboration and understanding.

• Most employees who were surveyed (72 percent) indicated confidence in the new protection and security strategy, applauding the results of the actions taken. Workforce Protection functions are now viewed as more important.

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