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**Global Terrorism, Political Instability and
International Crime Council
March 2011**

Welcome to the March 2011 newsletter of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council, featuring:

- Council member **Peter Probst**, nationally recognized authority on terrorism and threat development, recently published an article titled, “**Winds of War,**” in “Inside Homeland Security” magazine. His article deals with the Israeli Government’s approach to terrorism and is reprinted in this newsletter with permission from “Inside Homeland Security” magazine.
(see Page 3)
- Council member **Dr. Robin McFee**, medical director Threat Science, toxicologist and expert in bioterrorism/WMD briefly discusses her recent experiences in Bahrain, and some thoughts on larger issues across the Middle East - Part 1
(see Page 9)
- Special Advisor to the Council, **Dr. Stephen Sloan**, Lawrence J. Chastang Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies at the University of Central Florida, published his latest book in December, 2010 with co-author Robert Bunker titled, “**Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training.**”
(see Page 12)
- Council member **Deena Disraelly**, research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University focusing on education, modeling, policy, and planning for emergency and consequence management in the military and civilian sectors, wrote an article titled “**Supply Chain Security: Regulations and Rules,**” describing the different concerns associated with Supply Chain Management.
(see Page 13)
- Council member **Bill Scott**, CPP, Director of Facility Security Risk and Intelligence programs for the largest Risk Management firm in the United States, discusses the ever changing political climate in the Middle East and the aspects of knowing who your friends and enemies in an article titled, “**The Enemy of My Enemy May Not Always be My Friend.**”
(see Page 16)
- Council member **Mario Possamai**, CPP, Senior Manager, Corporate Intelligence, Royal Bank of Canada, reviewed a book dealing with the rising threat of the Calabrian Mafia.
(see Page 18)

Council News

Time is still left to register for the Global Terrorism, Political Instability, and International Crime Council Conference, April 12th and 13th in Alexandria, VA

Spring is right around the corner and the Global Terrorism, Political Instability, and International Crime Council is gearing up for its Annual Conference. This year's conference will focus on the timely topic of mitigating international crime. Conference Co-Chairs, Dr. Robin McFee, Marcy Forman, and Deena Disraelly have put together a formidable list of speakers and panel presentations that will inform and challenge attendees. The goal of this year's annual conference is for all attendees to gain a better understanding of the issues facing international corporations and Government organizations related to international crime.

Congratulations to Council Member and NSAWW CEO Courtney Banks for Winning "Heroines in Technology" Award

November 17th, 2010: On November 12th, AFCEA NOVA and March of Dimes partnered to present Heroines in Technology, a testimonial gala to recognize and honor women in the field of technology for their dedication to community service. In addition to naming this year's award winners, the 10th Annual Heroines in Technology gala recognized a "Decade of Heroines" and reflected back on 53 former Heroines and where they are today.

Courtney Banks, CEO of National Security Associates WorldWide (NSAWW), was nominated and chosen out of thousands of women to be one of 16 finalists who were recognized for their outstanding commitment to serving our community. NSAWW is proud to announce that on Friday evening, Banks was selected as one of the two "Corporate Heroines" winners, for her dedication to several causes including the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and Hope for the Warriors.

Banks was also featured along with several of the other finalists in a feature called "Meet the Heroines" in this month's issue of Fairfax Woman. The feature can be found online at www.fairfaxwoman.com.

Council Member Olle Fjordgren speaks at ASIS International in Dallas, Texas

Council member Olle Fjordgren, a world renowned speaker on the threats facing organizations today, delivered an outstanding presentation at the last ASIS International Security conference held in Dallas, Texas last fall. Olle spoke on the initiation and development of the world's most nefarious eco-terrorist groups.

Council Member Mark Camillo speaks to Sports Security Conference in Qatar

Council member Mark Camillo, an internationally recognized expert on event safety and security was an invited speaker at the 1st International Sports Security Conference held in Doha, Qatar on March 9-10, 2011. The 2022 FIFA World Cup was recently awarded to Qatar. Mark Camillo presented before a group of approximately 100 invited sports security colleagues from around the world on "New Developments in Major Event Security". This Conference was held to help launch the International Center for Sport Security, a permanent non-profit institution based in Doha. Key messages included in Mark's presentation were that major event security has evolved in recent years to include all-hazards preparedness, which incorporates people, process and technology, and that mitigating security risks at major events can be achieved by building a plan that has been designed based on identifying potential threats and reducing the associated vulnerabilities. Creating public-private partnerships was also presented as a way in which some major event planners are staffing non-law enforcement sensitive positions, such as spectator screening access points at official venues.

Council Member Peter Probst discusses the tenuous position of the Israeli government dealing with Iran and other threats to its sovereignty in an article titled “Winds of War.” (Reprinted from “Inside Homeland Security” magazine)



Winds of War

By Peter S. Probst

I recently returned from Israel where I had been invited to speak at the World Wide Counter-Terrorism Summit. This was the 10th annual conference sponsored by Israel’s International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT). The four-day conference was organized by Dr. Boaz Ganor, the founder and director of the ICT, and his seasoned staff. The program attracted an estimated 1,300 attendees from some 90 different countries.

An issue that dominated many of the discussions concerned the threat of a nuclear Iran, and how Israel and the United States would likely respond to the challenge. Virtually every Israeli I spoke to was adamant that Iran could not be permitted to go nuclear. There was less certainty as to the degree and nature of support Israel could expect from its Western allies.

Despite official Israeli declarations that no decision has been made, I came away with the strong impression that at the highest levels of the Israeli government, a decision had been rendered. Israel will launch a military attack against Iranian nuclear facilities, and I believe the target list could well be broadened to ensure that Iran would not represent a serious threat to the Jewish state for years to come. To repeat a much overused phrase, “It is not a question of if, but when.”

The conference offered the opportunity to meet and talk with some of Israel’s highest ranking and most knowledgeable authorities on terrorism, as well as to attend a range of workshops that explored a variety of terrorism-related issues. It also provided the attendees an opportunity to compare experiences, explore new viewpoints, and expand their range of contacts. The attendees included top government decision makers, defense, intelligence, and police officials, as well as prominent academic scholars and security industry leaders from all over the world.

I was particularly impressed by the active participation of highest-level Israeli officials in what was described as the “Talking Heads Series.” Participants included former heads of Mossad and Shabak (Israel’s external intelligence and internal security services); former ministers of defense; former chiefs of staff of the Israeli Defense Force; former ministers of internal security; current and former commissioners of police; as well as former heads of the National Security Council and others.

In addition, there were a series of workshops that explored topics such as Islamist radicalization, counterterrorism efforts in failed states, fourth generation warfare, and terror and technology. The varied backgrounds and depth of knowledge of those participating in this phase of the conference, coupled with the candor of the Israeli officials, was impressive and made the conference particularly memorable.

The open and frank exchange between extremely knowledgeable professionals who do not pull

their punches is the hallmark of the ICT conferences and, as a result, I find these gatherings invariably stimulating. I have always come away with new insights and a fuller appreciation of the complexity of the challenges faced by other countries, and the diversity of tactics employed to counter their terrorist adversaries.

On the topic of Iran, there was remarkable consensus. For example, Danny Yatom, former head of Mossad, forcefully stated:

“Only military force can stop Iran. Since the sanctions are not enough, I am hopeful that the world will come to its senses and reach the conclusion that to stop the Iranian nuclear arms race; we will have to attack some of their nuclear facilities. If modern air forces, led by the United States, mobilize their capabilities, it is possible, if not to completely remove the threat, to at least delay it for a couple of years. If the world fails to meet the challenge, Israel retains the right of self-defense. Some people say we should pray that Iran does not go nuclear. Praying is good, but we can also take action.”

Shaul Mofaz, a former Israeli Defense Force chief of staff and minister of defense, observed: “We don’t have the privilege to allow Iran to achieve a nuclear capability. Iran means what it says. Yes, continue the dialogue. Yes, increase the sanctions on Iran. There must also be a military option. I hope the international community will take the necessary steps. To those who say it is possible to contain a nuclear Iran, I say that is not possible.”

Boaz Ganor, the founder and director of the ICT, addressed the issue by stating:

“A nuclear Iran is unthinkable. It is a strategic threat. Israel is perceived as being strong. Hizbullah and Hamas are deterred, but they will never give up their ambition to destroy Israel. From tiny kids to their top leadership, they all say it. You don’t have to be a prophet to know what Iran will do. Ahmadinejad goes to the United Nations and talks about the destruction of Israel and nothing happens!”

A similar view was expressed by Don Radlauer, director of the Institute for the Study of Asymmetric Conflict, who in private correspondence explored the applicability of the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and noted:

“Some experts assure us that mutually-assured destruction would work as well for Iran and Israel as it did for the U.S. and the USSR, but other experts confidently assert the opposite—that the incineration of Iran could be seen as an acceptable price for the destruction of Israel. Israel cannot afford to be 80% or even 95% sure that deterrence will prevent an Iranian nuclear attack; and thus Israel will almost certainly be forced to choose a pre-emptive strategy if sanctions and negotiations fail.”

The September 21 issue of Israel Today Magazine featured an article titled “Israel: No choice but to attack Iran,” which I believe succinctly sums up the position of most high-level Israeli decision makers.

The Price to be Paid

Among Israelis, I found general agreement that the country would pay a very heavy price if it launched a pre-emptive strike. However, most also believe it would be better to take their losses up front than wait until later, when Iran’s position would most certainly be stronger and Israeli

casualties most certainly higher. It is a given that Tel Aviv and much of the country would come under ferocious missile bombardment and suffer significant casualties. Terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hizbullah, as well as the al Quds Force, the elite arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) that specializes in covert, extraterritorial operations, would attack targets inside Israel as well as Jewish and U.S. targets in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Worldwide embassies would be bombed, synagogues burned, and Israelis and Jews murdered.

The Logic of Inevitability

I see the following considerations at play and events unfolding in the following manner. Israel would not attack Iran without first advising the U.S. administration, but this should not be confused with asking permission, which is something I do not believe, is in the cards. Because the Israelis are absolutely convinced that the survival of the nation is at stake, the U.S. does not have leverage to veto an attack, but depending on the situation, we can influence the timing and, perhaps, the scale of such an operation.

I assume the Israelis are making the argument with Washington that because their attack is inevitable; it is in the U.S. national interest to fully support it. A nuclear Iran would be a disaster for all concerned, and because several of the nuclear sites reportedly are beyond the range of Israeli aircraft, and Israel lacks the special ordnance needed to penetrate the underground installations, American participation would be needed if an attack were to be fully successful.

I believe the Israelis would argue that even if the U.S. were to sit on the sidelines and proclaim its non-involvement, we, nevertheless, would be seen as complicit and reap the consequences, which could be considerable. To minimize the costs to the U.S., they would argue we really have little choice but to fully engage. The logic is compelling, and in my opinion an accurate reflection of today's reality.

I do not believe that an Israeli attack would be limited to destroying or disrupting Iran's nuclear capabilities, but would rather comprise a series of operations designed to deny Iran the ability to challenge Israel now or in the near future. Targets would extend beyond the Iranian nuclear weapons program and include Iranian conventional and unconventional capabilities, sites, and individuals involved in their biological, chemical weapons, and missile programs. Leadership and installations of organizations such as their intelligence and security services, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its al Quds force, as well as terrorist groups such as Hizbullah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Hamas would be targeted for obliteration.

I would not be surprised to learn that Israeli special teams have been working for some time on the ground inside Iran to facilitate the targeting of lucrative sites; the sabotage of critical infrastructure, particularly communications, energy, and transport; and the targeting of key individuals who represent Iran's military, government, and scientific elite.

Doubtless, such an attack would significantly change the current balance of power within the region. Some at the conference were concerned as to how Arab and other Muslim states would respond. There is a school of thought, to which I subscribe, that the Arab states would be secretly delighted and turn a blind eye, although no doubt there would be official protestations, but even these might be muted. The Arab streets might be aflame, but many Arab governments would secretly applaud.

Jeffery Goldberg, in his excellent article in the September issue of *The Atlantic*, relates a conversation he had with Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to the United States. The ambassador bluntly stated that his country would support a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. He further noted that if the U.S. permitted Iran to cross the nuclear threshold, the small countries of the Gulf would have no choice but to leave the American orbit and, for self-protection, ally with Iran. Countries, much like people, most always go with the strong horse.

In his article, Goldberg also reported that several Arab leaders have suggested that America's standing in the Middle East depends on its willingness to confront Iran, and argue that an aerial attack on a handful of Iranian facilities would not be as complicated or as messy as invading Iraq. One Arab foreign minister told Goldberg:

"This is not a discussion about the invasion of Iran. We are hoping for the pinpoint striking of several dangerous facilities. America could do this very easily."

The Saudi Role

Saudi Arabia has a historic and deep-seated antipathy towards Iran that is grounded in the ancient Arab-Persian rivalry and the Sunni-Shia rift. Over the years, the Saudis increasingly have come to see Iran as a major threat and themselves in the Iranian crosshairs. Our recent \$60 billion arms sale to the Saudis, the largest ever, is to help Saudi Arabia become an effective bulwark against Iranian expansionism, filling the vacuum left by the destruction of Iraq that for years had fulfilled that role.

Saddam Hussein may have been a monster, but sometimes it takes a monster to fight a monster. And there was much to be said for having two monsters at each other's throats and trying to calibrate the intensity of their struggle to enable each to inflict maximum damage on the other. Although the Saudis may soon possess state-of-the-art equipment, it will be of little use unless its military is trained, exercised, and fully proficient in its use—a level of professionalism that could take considerable time to achieve. I, therefore, conclude that the Saudis would permit us to use their territory to carry out air and other operations against Iran, while requesting that we maintain as low a profile as possible.

Living in "Interesting Times"

An issue of great concern is how Shia Iran will ultimately relate to Shia-dominated Iraq. There have been numerous and credible media reports of Iranian intelligence operatives working in-country not only providing weapons, training, and operational guidance to Iraqi insurgents, but also engaging in aggressive political-action operations that involve not only Shia militias and revered clerical figures but also target the highest levels of the Shia-dominated Iraqi government.

I do not see Iraq being able to maintain a viable coalition government, and believe it likely such efforts will fail, with Iraq dividing along ethnic lines. It may be that only a strong man can hold that fractious country together, and I do not see anyone on the horizon who might fill that bill. The nightmare scenario, of course, would be if the Shia south not only becomes a pawn of Tehran but, in effect, a rump state of a "Greater Iran."

However, Israel is not a country to sit idly while its enemies plot its destruction. Escalating tensions between Israel and Iran and a series of recent incidents strongly suggest a well-planned campaign of sabotage and covert action is under way to cripple Iranian capabilities and keep the leadership off

balance.

In Iran and Europe, according to credible media reports, Iranian scientists and key figures in the Iranian procurement and enrichment program have disappeared or been assassinated. Some are believed to have defected. There have been mysterious explosions at Iranian military sites, and Israel reportedly has worked to introduce defective components critical to the Iranian nuclear program into the supply chain.

Mossad and Western intelligence agencies reportedly have recruited key scientists within the nuclear program to report on its progress, and other assets to carry out acts of sabotage. Recently Tehran reported that it had uncovered a “nest of spies” within the program, the intent of the publicity no doubt being to discourage others from following a similar path. But by far the most intriguing development has been the introduction of the Stuxnet worm that apparently was specifically developed to attack supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems used to control complex industrial systems such as those that manage critical infrastructure or manufacturing processes.

SCADA systems are notoriously vulnerable to such attack, a fact that has been publicized in the open literature for years. The Stuxnet worm apparently targets and seizes control of these systems, and Iran is not known for its ability to mount effective cyber defenses or counter operations. News articles report that the Stuxnet worm has damaged nuclear facilities in Natanz and delayed the start-up of the Bushehr Nuclear Power plant.

Because of the complexity and sophistication of the Stuxnet program, most reports suggest it could have only been developed by a nation-state, prime suspects being Israel or the United States. The worm and the manner in which it has been employed have been described as a working and fearsome prototype of a cyber-weapon that will lead to the creation of a new arms race in the world.

Private Thoughts

Although most everyone with whom I spoke sees these developments as a campaign to delay and disrupt the Iranian program, I would argue that rather than simply being indicative of a simmering situation, what is currently under way is the ramp-up to the actual attack. I suspect one of the first indicators that the Israeli operation has launched could be cyber attacks against Iranian air defense, communications, and command and control systems, rendering them impotent.

The Iranians are anything but dense. They can see the writing on the wall. Iran is already seeking to renew talks, no doubt to buy time for its program. They probably believe such a strategy could exacerbate differences among U.S. decision makers and strengthen the hand of those who would argue that, just one more time, we should give peace a chance.

There is always the possibility that if Israel were to come under intense pressure to stand down, it might precipitate a decision, seize the initiative, accelerate its timetable, and present the U.S. with a fait accompli.

As things stand now, I do not believe an Israeli attack would occur before January and would most likely take place in late spring or summer when a new and presumably more hard-line American Congress would be in place; the effects of the sanctions regime and other measures could be better

assessed; patience exhausted; and Saudi Arabia would be receiving significant deliveries of the promised American military equipment, presumably accompanied by American advisors, trainers, and support personnel. An increased U.S. military presence on Saudi soil, however, could well generate its own set of problems, but that is best left for another article.

I have no doubt that the Iranian leadership has gamed out the situation, and its military and ruling elites can foresee losing all the power and privilege they have accrued since the revolution should they continue on their present course. The price exacted by the Americans as a consequence of Saddam's intransigence must be fresh in their memory. They could decide that the Israeli attack is likely to be similarly devastating, and when coupled with American military power, a change of policy may no longer be a matter of choice but rather one of survival. An Iranian "charm offensive" may be in the offing. On the other hand, if the hard-liners fail to back down, an optimist could argue that the military might move to protect its equities and continued hard-line intransigence could presage regime change.

Whether charm offensive or regime change, I believe it is too late. Given recent revelations about the extent and sophistication of the North Koreans' nuclear program, their history as a proliferator, their long-standing covert relationship with Iran, and the failure of U.S. intelligence to detect this game-changing development, an Israeli attack, in my view, becomes "drop dead certain." The undetected nature of the North Korean advance must have shaken Israel's confidence in U.S. capabilities to provide early warning. For us, a failure to anticipate an Iranian breakout would be an embarrassment. For the Israelis, it could be catastrophic. They/we have no choice. For the Iranians, the clock has run out. As the Chinese might say, "We are living in interesting times!"

Peter Probst, a member of the ASIS International Committee on Global Terrorism, International Crime, and Political Instability serves as a Senior Partner for National Security Associates WorldWide, and formerly served as the Special Assistant for Concept Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also previously held the position of Assistant for Terrorism Intelligence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

Council Member Dr. Robin McFee discusses her recent experiences in Bahrain and the larger context of Middle Eastern political unrest



Situation in Bahrain

by Robin McFee

I've just returned from Bahrain where last week the capital, Manama was involved in a street revolt. To be sure, not many people get the opportunity to name a revolt (Bahrain and the *Popcorn Revolution; Why the kingdom matters to the West*, available at www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.8808/pub_detail.asp), let alone see or experience one first hand and interview several participants- protestors, government, media. Which is what I was 'privileged?' to do last week. And unlike Palestine/Israel 2000 or prior experiences viewing unrest in that part of the world, the Bahrain, Egyptian, Libyan and future other ones in the region represent additional threats that security professionals need to consider, in addition to the traditional ones.

To date the tiny, but strategically important kingdom remains under the kings control, and relatively secure/stable. As in all things Middle Eastern the balance between war and peace can change in a NY minute. And unlike secular societies, there is no way to ignore the omnipresent influence of religion in daily life in Islamic societies, and the underlying dynamic interplay between Sunni (in power) and Shia (population majority). We in the West too often think in terms of borders and our own sensibilities. Yet the borders in the region are lines in the sand, often the residual legacy of colonial powers; they ignore true tribal territoriality. Our sensibilities are not truly the same as those in other cultures; something we need to recognize. Sun Tzu cautioned the importance of understanding ones' adversaries as well as ourselves. This is a bad time for ignorance. And while the media would underplay the impact of agents provocateur, especially Tehran's reach into the area, there should be no denying the regional influences extending from Saudi Arabia to Iran, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood at work in Bahrain. For better or worse, this tiny island nation may just be the football or the trophy between "Team West" and "Team Unrest".

During the course of my time there, a group of security folks got to share insights and discuss a variety of worrisome issues. From the onset, Bahrain, like much of the Middle or Near East lends itself as a surreal experience. While there always remain certain "threat givens" in that region, several security issues of concern, lessons needing to be learned have emerged. What follows are brief overviews. A more in-depth discussion will be presented at the annual conference and future articles

Facebook ® Revolutionaries – The Power of Social Media

Not too long ago if you wanted to get a group of folks together you used a phone tree and if you were very savvy naughty folks, 'burn phones' or similar – and in a matter of time you'd get a small to medium sized group together; this usually requiring some advanced planning. Now imagine having 500 – 10,000 like minded or like-caused people – an affinity group if you will, all "friends" on a facebook page dedicated to the cause.with a simple set of keystrokes, you can facebook, text or twitter a mini army that can arrive in a matter of seconds. No phone trees, no need to rely upon multiple operators. One person can inform, inspire, invite even incite a crowd of people in near live time. Police and military movements can be disclosed. The mood of the crowd, speeches given, the size of the crowd can all be monitored and shared by one or few people at a gathering. Consider the security implications – the ability to empower and deploy masses of people, block roadways, and isolate key locations, nearly on demand!

From Egypt to Libya, Bahrain to Yemen, and future locations – social media in the digital age is both a tool for and threat to security.

In the West we often credit Google, the Internet and other social media as weapons against oppressive regimes such as China. And to be sure, that can be the case. The Internet does provide a breath of fresh air and a window into democracy. However, let us not forget the prescient warnings of Orwell's Animal House, and the realities behind the Iron Curtain where technologies were deftly used against the people. We are sadly behind the learning curve on this and other cyber threats. We would be more than a bit naïve if we don't consider these technologies as weapons, powerful weapons against us, especially in asymmetric warfare. Few should argue there is a fifth column in the US. Add social media as another weapon in their arsenal.

Anyone with a child in high school knows that the facebook or myspace pages give an important insight into what is going on in that person's life if not mind. Why else would employers and colleges check social media sites as part of their background checks? But the power of these tools goes far beyond merely information exchange in the theoretical. Anyone with a half decent cell phone can now mobilize the masses, upload troop movements, and other logistical information, share company secrets on a scale unimagined even 3 years ago. As security professionals we need to step up our game to understand as well as counter this threat.

While I was in the midst of the crowds at The Pearl last week, one of the men I was speaking with twittered some friends. In less than ten minutes two carloads full of guys appeared, knowing exactly where he was, and joined the group. They said another 20 of their friends were on their way! Imagine if he had been a plant to incite folks, bringing in angry enforcers instead of just more attendees? It would be foolhardy to think neither Iran nor our allies had stationed agents in the crowd for such a purpose, but hope is not a strategy.

Taking this closer to home the crowds in Wisconsin can in some measure be attributed to being akin to facebook protestors. Are we monitoring affinity/adversary/threat group social media sites? If we aren't one of the "friends" then we are missing an intelligence and information gathering opportunity. We'll discuss this and similarly related security threats at the upcoming **Transnational Crime Conference, April 11/12, 2011 in Alexandria, Virginia** (https://www.asisonline.org/store/program_detail.xml?id=116008350).

Health Threats

Public health, emerging pathogens and health disparities bundled together should be considered one of the new security threats of the 21st century. Consider the impact – medical, human, financial, security and psychological – of Dengue – a hemorrhagic viral disease that made a dramatic entrance to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, it was a topic of concern and worrisome issue.

Beyond the notion that there are many state, state sponsored and non-state actors with some form of bioweapons program; shifts in population, alterations of natural environments through development, harvesting or mining, and Mother Nature foisting a surprise pathogen – all pose a threat from visitors to your company sites, to sending teams abroad, to indigenous folks working in international partners all along your supply chain. From executive protection to product delivery – health is a new security threat.

Consider what it would be like if you and your family, as privileged executives living in an emerging nation, are in the midst of a public health outbreak in an impoverished region. You and your family, servants, team are likely much better cared for, safer, more protected and resource blessed than the locals who don't work for you or your company. Think that spreads good will? The range of threats from that scenario are many.

Health threats – whether intentionally disseminated as was the case with Anthrax in the US during the autumn of 2001, waterborne diseases in the post earthquake period in Haiti, SARS in the Pacific

Rim, unaccounted for losses of vials from CDC, USAMRIID or global bio-labs, the accidental tourist spreading measles as was Boston 2006 - all remain an emerging and evolving security issue; we will discuss this in greater depth in future articles, and at the Transnational Crime Conference in April. https://www.asisonline.org/store/program_detail.xml?id=116008350

The Main Stream Media

A free press is part of the foundation for democracy. But the media – whether by choice, coercion or government control can become a willing or unwitting accomplice to less than desirable outcomes, and less than honorable people. During my time in Bahrain I interacted with several reporters for well known Western media outlets. Most had already made up their minds about the cause of the problem and the likely outcome, and were reporting as if those were fait accompli while events were still unfolding.

When I asked them if they thought it was a Shia, Sunni issue, several said that was minimal – it was about freedom and democracy and getting jobs. Really? By that logic there should be more rioting in our streets, given the unemployment rate of the US is higher than that in Egypt, according to data published in the Feb 18 issue of “The Economist!” It is also being touted as a youth movement, not a religious or political one. Hmmm, how does one separate those issues in theocracies? Moreover, given published demographics/average age of folks in the region, unless we mobilize infants or the elderly, who else is going to protest?

Apparently most of the folks we met in the press corps were drinking the Kool Aid – and had not bothered to question the chants “Not Shia, not Sunni, Bahraini” – which by the way was being spoken by Shia, not Sunni! When I asked if Iran or Muslim Brotherhood (MB) had a hand in this – not surprisingly the answers were mostly “no.” Some reporters said Iran was exploiting it at home in their media, but not inciting it. They were adamant that Iran did not have cells or agents working the situation there. Moreover most opined that Tehran had its own problems with protestors and was too preoccupied with internal challenges to bother with other countries. They downplayed the importance or danger of the MB as well. Oh really? May I refer the media to some of Peter Probst’s work on radicalization and the MB. Needless to say the notion of “rent-a-protestor” gangs feel on deaf ears.



To be sure, the media can be a force for good; but only when objective journalism trumps sensationalizing or promoting agenda/ideology

Conclusion...Part 1

Bahrain is a critical ally for the US and symbolically an arena that represents a potential victory for our adversaries. On one side is the US/Saudi team, and the other the Tehran/MB team. Several threats worth our consideration come into specific relief from the recent region wide protests – ones that all security professionals should be mindful of, including the near live time movement of large masses of people, the ability to persuade using social media, and the power of the digital age media in general. We are way beyond passwords and cloud security!

Dr. Robin McFee is a toxicologist and nationally recognized expert in WMD preparedness, she is a consultant to government agencies, corporations and the media. Dr. McFee is the former director and cofounder of the Center for Bioterrorism Preparedness (CB PREP) and was bioweapons - WMD adviser to the Regional Domestic Security Task Force Region 7 after 9/11, as well as advisor on avian and swine flu preparedness to numerous agencies and organizations. Dr. McFee is a member of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council of ASIS International, and member of the US Counterterrorism Advisory Team. She has delivered over 400 invited lectures since 9-11, authored more than 100 articles on terrorism, health care and preparedness, and coauthored two books: Toxic-Terrorism by McGraw Hill and The Handbook of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Agents, published by Informa/CRC Press.

Special Advisor to the Council, Dr. Stephen Sloan, published his latest book, “Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training” in December 2010




Using red teams in today's counterterrorism training

Keeping ahead of terrorists requires innovative, up-to-date training. This follow-up to Stephen Sloan's pioneering 1981 book, *Simulating Terrorism*, takes stock of twenty-first-century terrorism—then equips readers to effectively counter it. Quickly canvassing the evolution of terrorism—and of counterterrorism efforts—over the past thirty years, co-authors Sloan and Robert J. Bunker draw on examples from the early 2000s, following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, to emphasize the need to prevent or respond quickly to "active aggressors"—terrorists who announce their presence and seek credibility through killing. Training for such situations requires realistic simulations—whose effectiveness, the authors show, depends on incorporating red teams; that is, the groups that play the part of active aggressors.

In *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training*, Sloan and Bunker, developers of simulation-driven counterterrorist training, take readers through the prerequisites for and basic principles of conducting a successful simulation and preparing responders to face threats—whether from teenage shooters or from sophisticated terrorist organizations. The authors clearly explain how to create an effective red team whose members can operate from within the terrorists' mindset. An innovative chapter by theater professional Roberta Sloan demonstrates how to use dramatic techniques to teach red teams believable role-playing.

Rounding out this book, a case study of the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood illustrates the cost of failures in intelligence and underscores the still-current need for serious attention to potential threats. First responders—whether civilian or military—will find *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training* indispensable as they address and deter terrorism now and in the future.

The book is available via the University of Oklahoma press, at www.oupress.com.



Council Member Deena Disraelly discusses the complex issues surrounding Supply Chain Security



Supply Chain Security: Regulations and Rules

By Deena Disraelly

Two weeks after September 11th, trucks were backed up at the Canada-Michigan border for more than fifteen hours awaiting inspection and entry into the United States. These trucks were carrying four-hour advance order parts for the “Just-in-Time” auto manufacturers in Detroit, Michigan. Cargo was being held offshore and was unable to reach its final destinations. Manufacturing plants in the U.S. were forced to decide whether or not to idle lines. The private sector and the government quickly identified the need for a better means of securing cargo coming into the U.S. They enacted three key pieces of regulation and introduced several programs.

These programs solicited and relied on the voluntary assistance of the private sector to ensure the safety and security of cargo being imported into the United States.

Nearly ten years later, these same regulations and rules, with some changes, still serve as the principle guidance for companies with international supply chains. This article provides a brief review of just a few of these programs.

Supply Chain Security Legislation



Aviation and Transportation Security Act: Also dubbed “The Sky Marshals Act”, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, was passed in November 2001. The act created three new organizations within the DOT – the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Transportation Security Oversight Board, and the Federal Security Managers. The TSA was later moved to DHS. In addition, the act mandated several new security measures. Federal flight deck officers – sky marshals – were to be deployed on all passenger flights and any other flight which was determined by the Secretary of Transportation to pose a high security risk.

Cockpit access was restricted and mandatory hardening of all cockpit doors – to prevent an explosive or fragmentation device from being used to gain access to the cockpit – was imposed. Additional screening, security and inspection measures were put into place and education programs for crew, baggage handlers, and others in the aviation community were also mandated. Further, in answer to concerns about the grounding of all aircraft following the September 11th attacks, the act allows for transport of freight, mail, emergency medical supplies, personnel or patients on aircraft even during a time of air emergency. One noted problem with the act was that it did not address air cargo carried on passenger planes; all baggage carried aboard by a passenger is screened; however, cargo screening was not mandated by the act.

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA): The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 followed a year after the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The legislation's intent is to increase security at the nation's ports by providing structure, coordination, and planning. The act requires the implementation of Area Security Committees – partnerships between the United States Coast Guard (USCG), local law enforcement, state and local regulators, and the passenger and cargo trade industries – to minimize the threat of an attack in a local port. It also requires the development of security plans and procedures, security self assessments, and addition of new security measures, along with the potential for new security technologies. Two additional requirements were promulgated under the MTSA: cargo container seals guidelines and a transportation worker identification card (TWIC).

The Secure and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006: The SAFE Port Act codified regulations for improving port security, including maritime facility requirements and interagency operational centers for ports. The act also introduced the Port Security Grant and expanded both the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). A reauthorization act was introduced in 2010 and is currently in committee review.

Customs and Border Patrol Programs

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): C-TPAT is the first worldwide effort to engage the shipping and carrier communities in partnerships to prevent terrorists from exploiting U.S. relationships and facilities overseas, material bound for the U.S. and containers and ships used for transportation to effect another attack on American soil. The program was developed on the foundation of the Customs Carrier Initiative Program (CIP) which engaged the assistance of the private sector to prevent the smuggling of narcotics into the United States. The purpose of the program is twofold: security and facilitation of trade moving into the United States.

Under the agreements of the program, companies perform a self-assessment of their own supply chains and turn in survey results to Customs, then make improvements as necessary and ensure that certain security measures and preparatory and response operations are in place throughout the whole supply chain. The security plans are reviewed, approved, and later validated by agents of CBP, and in exchange, companies are classified as lower-risk and are guaranteed faster, more reliable supply chains, with less chance of inspections prior to importation of goods.

Free and Secure Trade (FAST): FAST began as a cooperative agreement between the United States and Canada, then expanded to include Mexico, to open fast lanes of traffic for approved shippers and carriers to use when bringing goods across the border. The purpose of the program was to reduce the threats to public safety and security, minimize time across the borders, and partner with trusted private sector companies to secure shipments in the supply chain. Participants ensure that every aspect of their supply chain is secured in compliance with C-TPAT, and, in return, gain access to dedicated lanes at the border, fewer inspections, and head-of-the line privileges for inspections, and improved supply chain security.

Container Security Initiative (CSI): In January 2002, Customs initiated CSI to take advantage of the large percentage of American-bound cargo passing through these ports. The program places customs inspectors in the partner ports where they then conduct cargo border inspections, effectively expanding the borders to these ports. Reciprocally, these countries can send inspectors to operate and conduct inspections in US ports. The three core elements of the program include: identify high risk containers; prescreen and evaluate containers before shipping; and, use technology for screening without slowing trade movement.

Secure Freight Initiative (SFI): The secure freight initiative, a partnership between the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy, began in 2007 and provides screening for nuclear and radiological material in foreign ports participating in SFI. In combination with risk assessment information and intelligence, risk analysis, targeting, and screening of high risk containers overseas are improved.



Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC): Effective April 2009, a TWIC card is required for all personnel, including truck drivers, requiring unescorted access to secure areas of ports around the country.

Future of Supply Chain Security

Supply chain security since 9/11 has focused on the introduction of both detection and identification. Improved identification of risks, whether they are related to personnel or located in containers, is the likely future supply chain security. Through the combination of technology, increased intelligence, and corporate investment in partnership and security, supply chains will continue to move rapidly and ensure security for trade and the homeland.

Deena Disraelly is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses and a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University focusing on education, modeling, policy, and planning for emergency and consequence management in the military and civilian sectors. The views expressed in this article presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect those of the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Department of Defense, or the federal government.

Council Member Bill Scott, CPP, discusses Political Instability in the Middle East and the tightrope that the US walks in foreign policy decisions trying to determine who potential allies should be and who to empower



The Enemy of My Enemy is NOT Always My Friend

by Bill Scott, CPP

The events in Libya over the past month are horrible as war and conflict will always be. Civilian casualties are always a by-product of such conflict and offer all of us in the United States an opportunity to reflect on the old adage stating that “Freedom is not free!” We can thank our ancestors in this country for fighting to provide us the freedoms we now enjoy. Our form of government came at a price as we now see countries across the Middle East struggle with the concepts of Democracy and Freedom. I understand that Egypt was the first domino to fall, and an argument could be made that the US really introduced the concepts via Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and then Iraq. I want to focus the message of this article specifically on the US involvement in Libya.

This conflict presents a tenuous and nearly impossible situation for foreign policy planners. As a former Marine, and someone who commanded troops in combat, I see the situation in Libya as a nightmare. There is no clear mission objective. The Coalitions forces under NATO command have a mandate to protect civilians and enforce a no-fly zone. The latter mandate sounds easy at first. Any Libyan aircraft attempting to fly gets shot down. Upon further review however, shooting down planes certainly has potential to endanger civilians violating the former mandate and therein lies problem # 1 with the situation. Problem # 2 is even more complex, “Who are the rebels and is there unity amongst their factions?”



We have a dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, who has proven to be a bad guy over the years. Some of my younger colleagues have started to warm to the kinder, gentler public persona presented by Gaddafi over the past few years. Those of us with who are longer in the tooth know however the history of Libya as a sponsor of terrorism and that Gaddafi has been central in that role. I think we can agree that given Gaddafi’s links to terror coupled with the bombing of his own citizens makes him a bad guy. I have heard many discuss the actions that the US should remove Gaddafi immediately from power. Here is where I have to put up a large “Stop” sign and ask everyone to take a deep breath.



The situation in Libya grew from protests to rebel factions forming in defiance of the Government. Gaddafi reacted to these rebels by bombing their strongholds, including with airstrikes. Civilian casualties were large and the United Nations and subsequently the United States stepped in under the mandate of protecting civilians. That role is difficult enough, but what about the next step?

I believe it is clear that the next decision point for the Coalition troops (of which the US is the major force provider) will be do whether to allow the Libyan Army to destroy the rebels with ground troops or do to aid the rebels, ultimately engaging the Libyan Army on their behalf. At first glance the old adage, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend,” applies. I say, “No it does not!”

US history is full of foreign policies built upon convenience rather than sound decision making. Saddam Hussein, and Osama Bin Laden are probably the two most famous as well as recent examples of one-time recipients of US aid who later turned out to be more evil than anyone could have imagined. I hope that someone in the administration has the wherewithal to consider that a

junior Bin Laden or Hussein is stationed somewhere amongst the rebels hoping for the opportunity to receive US weapons and training.

An additional aspect to the question of “Who are the rebels?” are the questions, “How many rebels are there?” and “How many different *factions* of rebels are there?” If Iraq taught us nothing else it was that when you remove a sovereign power there is a gap that must be filled. Deciding who fills that gap has populated many a page in the annals of world history. Major wars have been fought by those seeking to assume that power.

In the case of Libya there are numerous cronies under Gaddafi chomping at the bit to gain power and carry on Gaddafi’s legacy. In their absence, who amongst the rebels could step into that role? Remember that the job description of a revolutionary is far different than that of a national leader. It is often easier to obtain a job than it is to keep the job and work it effectively, I imagine running a country is a similar dynamic.

So given that the Coalition forces prefer not to have someone who held a major office under Gaddafi to succeed him, who does that leave in a power vacuum? Is there any certainty that a leader of one rebel faction has any clout with the other factions? History would say no. History would also say that a civil war likely would ensue amongst the rebel factions currently chomping at the bit for US and Coalition aid. I would wager that some of the factions of the rebel forces would prefer Islamic Law and a Theocratic form of Government given the opportunity and have no interest in a Democratic system of Government. No matter what the different rebel leaders seem to be and what they might say today it is important to understand the history and culture of the region and these personalities.

There is also a possibility that some factions of the rebel forces represent organized criminal interests. There is also long history of organized criminal elements thriving under nascent Democratic forms of Government (see US and Russia for two great examples).

There is no question in my mind that some people are good and some are bad. I have a simpler outlook on the world than most people. I also do not like coffee and believe there is a correlation there. I have Gaddafi sitting squarely in the bad category. I would love to wake up tomorrow morning knowing that Gaddafi is in jail awaiting trial for war crimes against the world and not ruling the country of Libya. I would love to wake up knowing the people of Libya embraced Democracy and elected a candidate freely and voted with their conscience, not out of fear or bribery. I do not think the latter is possible anytime soon. I also believe firmly that if the former occurs without the proper preparation that the cure will be worse than the disease.

Bill Scott is a member of the ASIS International Council on Global Terrorism, International Crime, and Political Instability. He is a Certified Protection Professional through ASIS International, certified Project Management Professional through the Project Management Institute and serves as a Director for Security Risk and Intelligence programs with ABS Consulting the leading Risk Management firm in the United States. He lives in southern Maryland with his wife and two children.

Council Member Mario Possamai, CPP, reviews a book that discusses the far-reaching effects of the Calabrian Mafia and how difficult it can be to reach the top layers of major criminal organizations



Book Review

By Mario Possamai, CPP

While the Sicilian Mafia (and its North American affiliates) may have a higher public profile, its lesser-known Calabrian cousin, the ‘Ndrangheta (pronounced N-Drahn-Gay-Tah), is increasingly keeping law enforcement officials up at night.

Over the past three decades, the loosely organized criminal clans of Calabria, the region at the “toe” of the Italian peninsula, have grown from focussing on kidnappings to a global presence with illicit operations across Europe, the Americas and Australia.¹

Indeed, the ‘Ndrangheta is believed to control 80 percent of the cocaine entering Europe. Italian magistrates estimate its annual income at more than 35 billion euros (about US\$48 billion). Around the world, it has an estimated 10,000 members, perhaps double the number of the Sicilian Mafia.²

The story of the ‘Ndrangheta’s dramatic expansion is the focus of a seminal new book, *La Malapianta* (the Evil Plant), by the world’s two leading experts on this crime group: Judge Nicola Gratteri and journalist Antonio Nicaso. (Disclosure: I know both men and acted as Gratteri’s translator at an organized crime forum in 1996. While the book has not yet been translated into English, it provides such a wealth of information that I believe it should find a home in law enforcement and criminal justice studies libraries.)



Figure 1 - Judge Nicola Gratteri (left) and author Antonio Nicaso (right)

until then secret initiation rights. Trained as a lawyer, he now resides in Canada.

This book has been on Italy’s best-seller list for six weeks. Demand was so great that the publisher had to print 10 editions in a single month. Unfortunately, it is not yet available in an English translation.

As might be expected, both Gratteri and Nicaso have incurred the ‘Ndrangheta’s wrath.

Gratteri has been the subject of repeated assassination attempts, including one effort involving an anti-aircraft missile. He and his family reside on an Italian military base. He never goes anywhere by himself, including to the bathroom. (How does he relax? By pattering away at a small garden behind his fortified home.)

Nicaso, for his part, found a bomb planted under his car after publishing details of the ‘Ndrangheta’s


¹ Unless otherwise footnoted, the information cited in this article comes from either *La Malapianta*, discussions by the author with Antonio Nicaso and Nicola Gratteri, or the author’s direct experience.

² “Move over Cosa Nostra,” *The Guardian*, June 8, 2006.

La Malapianta provides an insightful perspective on the rise and rise of the ‘Ndrangheta.

Like the Sicilian Mafia, the origins of the ‘Ndrangheta can be traced to the 19th Century. Like many crime groups, it emerged “in modernizing societies that are undergoing economic expansion, but lack a legal structure that reliably protects property rights or settles business disputes.”³

The ‘Ndrangheta first gained international attention in the early 1970s with the kidnapping of John Paul Ghetty III, the grandson industrialist J. Paul Ghetty. When the family refused to pay the ransom, an envelope containing a lock of hair and a human ear was sent by the kidnapers with a threat of further mutilation. A ransom was subsequently paid and John Paul Ghetty III was released.



According to *La Malapianta*, the profits from organized kidnapping in the 1970s and 1980s were used to help finance the expansion of ‘ndrine⁴, the basic (and quite autonomous) organizational units of the ‘Ndrangheta, into cocaine trafficking in the 1990s.

Although the ‘Ndrangheta initially obtained its cocaine through the Sicilian Mafia, it then established direct links with Colombia cocaine producers. Using these relationships, it now dominates the commercial importation of the illicit drug into Europe and has overshadowed the Sicilian Mafia with its reliance on the less important heroin trade.

In this regard, ‘Ndrangheta appears to have taken a leaf from the globalization process of the 20th century. As one of Gratteri’s fellow judges has put it: “The ‘Ndrangheta represents the globalization of Italian organized crime.”⁵

Can the ‘Ndrangheta be beaten?

When we first met some 15 years ago, Gratteri was confident of victory, perhaps by the time his then young children reached adulthood. Now, he is less certain. He told me recently that the ‘Ndrangheta is more powerful than ever and the criminal justice system is becoming overwhelmed. He still believes firmly the ‘Ndrangheta can be tamed, but only if governments have the will to do so and sufficiently cooperate.

“While this book has not yet been translated into English, Italian language editions can be purchased online from Mr. Nicaso’s web site (<http://nicaso.com/>) or at the following online book vendor: <http://www.libreriauniversitaria.it/malapianta-gratteri-nicola-mondadori/libro/9788804593690>

Mario Possamai, CPP, CFE, CAMS is a member of the ASIS Global Terrorism Council and is Senior Manager, Corporate Intelligence, Royal Bank of Canada

³ “How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the ‘Ndrangheta in Northern Italy,” by Federico Varese, Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, Number 59, University of Oxford, July 2005

⁴ The word derives from the Greek and means “a man who does not bend.” ‘Ndrina is the singular.

⁵ “Move over Cosa Nostra,” The Guardian, June 8, 2006.

Council Members

Council Chair - Colonel Brittain P. Mallow, USA (ret.) is a Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement practitioner with over 31 years of combined public and private sector experience. A career Middle Eastern Area Specialist and student of the region, he is conversant in Arabic language, culture and politics, and has served multiple tours in the Middle East. Britt is an Associate Department Head with MITRE Corporation where he supports national security efforts. The MITRE Corporation is a not-for-profit organization chartered to work in the public interest, serving US Government sponsors.

Council Vice-Chair - Inspector Kevin D. Eack is a senior level advisor in the Illinois State Police in the Division of Internal Investigations. He received a Juris Doctorate degree in 1983, previously served as a Special Agent for the FBI, as well as an Illinois state prosecutor. In 2007 he received a Master's Degree in Homeland Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security. He also represents the Council on the ASIS Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG).

Courtney B. Banks is the founder and CEO of Nat'l Security Associates Worldwide (NSAWW), a national security business consulting firm where she advises companies on business development within the homeland security, homeland defense, law enforcement and combating terrorism arenas. Ms. Banks has nearly two decades of experience within these fields, stemming from posts at the White House, the Pentagon, and as an executive officer in several Fortune 100 defense contracting companies.

Douglas Callen is President, Douglas I Callen and Associates, a security consulting company specializing in homeland security and business development with federal, state and local law enforcement and security markets. Doug's background includes 21 years as a Special Agent with the U.S. Secret Service, Director of Intelligence and National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Transportation, and most recently as the Chief Security Officer for the Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

Mark A. Camillo is Senior Vice President of Strategic Planning for Contemporary Services Corporation (CSC), the world's largest event security firm. Mark had a distinguished 21-year career as a Special Agent in the U.S. Secret Service, including three separate assignments at the White House, and serving as the agency's Deputy Assistant Director and as its Chief Technology Officer. He held several key positions during his career in major event planning, including being appointed the Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics.

Deena Disraelly is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses specializing in education, modeling, policy, and consequence management in the military and civilian sectors. She is also a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University focusing on improved community preparedness and disaster response. She has eight years of experience as a Naval Nuclear Engineer and a background in security, public affairs, and emergency exercise, education and training.

Jim Dunne has been a member of the Council since 2002. He is a senior analyst in the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and occasionally lectures at the George Washington University. He holds a Master's Degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and holds the designation of Certified Protection Professional from ASIS International.

Olle Fjordgren, Chief Executive Officer of Fjordgren Konsult AB, has worked in more than 25 countries. He has been advisor to the governments of Ethiopia, Pakistan and Mongolia and worked with Mujahedin in Afghanistan during the war with Soviet Union. He holds a Masters of Science from UCLA and the designation of Certified Protection Professional from ASIS International.

Marcy M. Forman is the Director of the Office of Investigations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and oversees the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, with more than 8,000 employees to include over 6,200 Special Agents, assigned to 26 Special Agent-in-Charge offices in major cities, and 181 other field offices throughout the United States, and administers a budget of more than \$1.6 billion. As Director, Ms. Forman is responsible for strategic planning, national policy implementation, and the development and execution of operational initiatives spanning the five major investigative program divisions within the Office of Investigations: National Security Investigations; Financial, Narcotics and Public Safety Investigations; Critical Infrastructure Protection and Fraud Investigations; Investigative Services; and Policy and Emergency Preparedness

Jack L. Johnson, Jr., is a Partner in the Washington Federal Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Formerly the first Chief Security Officer (CSO) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), he is a nationally and internationally recognized figure who serves as an industry consultant on a variety of security, law enforcement, risk management and intelligence related matters. He routinely testifies before Congress on homeland security and national security related issues and is a frequent speaker at many national and international conferences, seminars and symposiums.

Dr. Robin McFee, FACPM, FAACT, is medical director of Threat Science - a preparedness consultancy. She is a toxicologist and nationally recognized expert in WMD preparedness, who consults with government agencies, corporations and the media. Dr. McFee is the former director and cofounder of the Center for Bioterrorism Preparedness (CB PREP) and was bioweapons - WMD adviser to law enforcement/EMS including the Regional Domestic Security Task Force Region 7 after 9/11, as well as advisor on avian and swine flu preparedness. Dr. McFee is also a member of the US Counterterrorism Advisory Team. She has delivered over 400 invited lectures since 9-11, authored more than 100 articles on terrorism, health care and preparedness, and coauthored two books: *Toxicoterrorism* by McGraw Hill and *The Handbook of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Agents*, published by Informa/CRC Press.

Mario Possamai, CPP, CFE, CAMS, is a fraud, money laundering and critical incident management consultant. In 2003-7, he was Senior Advisor to Mr. Justice Archie Campbell, who headed the Commission into the infectious disease outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in Ontario. In 1997, he was part of the team that investigated the \$1 billion Bre-X gold mining fraud in Indonesia. He is on the Board of Advisors of Nat'l Security Associates WorldWide.

Peter Probst, Senior Partner, National Security Associates WorldWide, was Special Assistant for Concept Development, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and also held the position of Assistant for Terrorism Intelligence, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Peter spent 20 years with the CIA's Directorate of Operations and the Directorate of Intelligence specializing in combating terrorism, political warfare and insurgency. He co-authored the Pentagon study, "Terror-2000: The Future Face of Terrorism", that is widely credited with predicting the

9/11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon using hijacked passenger aircraft as improvised cruise missiles. Peter also speaks on terrorism and related issues to a variety of audiences both here and abroad that include government, private sector, academia, professional associations and civic groups.

Greg Schneider, M.Sc, CPP, is the Managing Director of Training Services for Kingdom Worldwide. He has previous operational counter terrorism and intelligence experience from military, law enforcement, and security agencies in Israel and the United States. Mr. Schneider received his M.Sc. in Protection Management from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in 2001 and BA in Criminal Justice from The George Washington University in 1993.

Douglas K. Beaver, CPP, is an internationally recognized security consultant and current senior level executive with Kastle Systems, a prominent international security technology integrator and leading provider of electronic access control systems. Mr. Beaver is the former President/CEO of a prominent Washington D.C. based security organization and previously held a senior level management position with a prominent global risk management firm. Mr. Beaver has over 25 years of experience within the law enforcement and security industries, and has provided security consultation, risk assessment analysis and homeland security training on a wide variety of security matters and industry best practices. Mr. Beaver's broad international security experience includes working with national police agencies, military, intelligence and security forces in high threat regions of the world including Israel, Jordan, India, Pakistan and South America. Mr. Beaver has published numerous articles and white papers for industry publications periodicals and has lectured internationally on homeland security, counterterrorism and business continuity for international trade associations, property management firms, and Fortune 1000 companies.

Richard H. "Dick" Ward is Dean of the Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Science at the University of New Haven. A former New York City detective, and author of books on criminal investigation and homeland Security, he has traveled to more than 60 countries as a speaker or consultant.

Bill Scott, CPP, PMP, CHS-IV is the Director of Department of Defense, Facility Security, and Intelligence programs at ABS Consulting. He has previous counterterrorism experience in the US Marine Corps as a combat veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom with experience in intelligence, targeting, and humanitarian assistance projects there and in other campaigns in the Middle East and Africa. Mr. Scott is also certified in International Security Program Management and is registered under the National Incident Management System as a responder under the area of Law Enforcement/Public Safety.

Special Advisors to the Council

Dr. Stephen Sloan is the Lawrence J. Chastang Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies at the University of Central Florida. He has engaged in research, taught and consulted on terrorism since the 1970's. He pioneered the practice of developing and conducting full-scale terrorist simulations. He has authored nine books and numerous articles.

Dr. Vahid Majidi is the FBI's Assistant Director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. The Directorate is responsible for coordinating and managing FBI's equities, activities, and investigations involving WMD. Dr. Majidi came to the FBI from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), where he served as the Chemistry Division Leader.

Prior to his career at LANL, Dr. Majidi was a tenured associate professor of chemistry at the University of Kentucky. His research activities focused on analytical spectroscopy and gas-phase chemistry. Dr. Majidi earned his BS degree in chemistry from Eastern Michigan University and his PhD from Wayne State University. After his graduate work, he spent two years as a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Texas (Austin).