



**Global
Terrorism,
Political
Instability and
International
Crime Council
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**Global Terrorism, Political Instability and
International Crime Council
March 2009**

This edition of the Council's newsletter features the following articles:

- **Council member Dr. Robin McFee writes on the continuing daunting challenge of controlling WMD's (See below).**
- **Council Chair Michael E Bouchard presents the Council's plans for 2009. (See page 2)**
- **A report on Council member Peter Probst's visit to India following the Mumbai terrorist attacks (See page 2)**
- **Professional activities of Council members Dr. Stephen Sloan, Mark Camillo, Dr. Robin McFee and Marcy Forman (See page 3)**
- **Profiles of Council member Kevin D. Eack and new Council Vice President Joseph Gulinello. (See pages 3-4)**
- **Thumbnail biographies of Council members. (See page 9)**

**Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: A
Daunting Task Gets Even Harder**

By Dr. Robin McFee

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently released its findings that Iran has enough low enriched uranium (LEU) to create a nuclear device.

Although not a shock to most in the preparedness arena, this revelation brought the threat into specific focus on a wider stage. Just a short time prior to this, Iran launched a satellite, demonstrating a capability to deliver a payload beyond the narrow confines of the region.

With at least four known uranium enrichment sites throughout the country, as well as proximity to Central Asian sources of supply, not to mention the potential to procure materials from Africa, these events give pause to reflect on the implication of an extremist regime possessing a nuclear Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

The bottom line: WMD's remain an important – and continuing – concern for "preparedness professionals" in the security, intelligence, health care, military, political and law enforcement disciplines. **(Continued on page 4)**

Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council – Goals for 2009

By Michael R. Bouchard, Council Chair

In 2008, the council noted several accomplishments to include hosting a spring conference, publishing a newsletter, speaking at local chapter meetings and most importantly, improved communication with the membership.

In 2009, our primary goal is to better serve the membership through regular communication channels. We plan on accomplishing this through a number of ways.

First, the council is designing a survey for the membership to determine what their needs are and more specifically, to learn how we can better meet their needs. We expect to submit the survey through ASIS International headquarters in March 2009 for review and distribution.

Second, we are in the planning stages to host a “Symposium/Roundtable” with key new Obama Administration officials to discuss recent trends in Global terrorism and Political Instability. We hope to make the results of this meeting available to the membership once the meeting takes place.

Third, we have a planning committee studying topics for at least two or three webinars for the membership this year. If there are any suggestions, please contact any one of the council members.

Fourth, as you may have noticed, our newsletter is becoming more robust. We continue to profile 1-2 council members each month to educate the membership about the caliber of people we have who are available when needed.

Finally, with deep regret, we had to cancel our 2009 Spring Global Terrorism conference. The council had successfully hosted this conference for 26 years. Due to the economic times that we are all facing, we made a decision to cancel the conference. However, we have begun to plan for our 2010 spring conference in Northern Virginia.

Peter S. Probst visits India following Mumbai Attacks

Council member **Peter S. Probst** was invited to India to speak at a conference sponsored by the Indian government and organized by the Centre for Defense and Security Studies. Attendees were high level Indian military and security officials. The primary focus was terrorism, Mumbai and the state of relations between the military and civilian sectors of government.

Discussion was exceedingly candid, and he appeared to be one of the only two non-Indians present. Participating Indian officials included the Deputy National Security Advisor; the former Defence Secretary; Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff; Former Chief of the Army Staff; Assistant Chief of the Integrated Defense Staff; Director of the Centre for Joint Warfare; Inspector General of the Police, etc.

Peter’s talk, which was well received, focused on the nature and practice of Political Warfare and examined Muslim Brotherhood operations being conducted inside the United States. Recall that Peter’s article on this significant issue was in the June 2008 edition of the newsletter.

Separate and apart from the conference, Peter also met one-on-one with MK Narayanan, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, for a one-hour conversation on terrorism and related issues.

On a related topic, Peter also spoke to the Washington Internship Program (WIP) on “Mumbai, Gaza and the Implications for US Security.” WIP has been in existence some 28 years and brings university and graduate students to the United States from virtually every country in the world.

Intern placements have included: The White House, the U.S House and Senate, National Institute of Health, Fortune 500 firms, major banking/finance institutions, major media outlets, etc.

Professional Activities of Note

Dr. Stephen Sloan made a presentation on the evolution of terrorism at the Special Operations Combating Terrorism Course at the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Florida, January 26. He is also a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Joint Special Operations University.

Mark A. Camillo, Director, Business Development, Integrated Systems & Global Services for the Lockheed Martin Corporation, presented at the 2009 Information Processing Inter-Agency Conference in Orlando, Florida. Panelist on the Cyber Security (Government/Law Enforcement Agencies) Panel.

In February of 2009, **Director Marcy M. Forman**, ICE Office of Investigations, attended and co-chaired the 28th Session of the Enforcement Committee of the World Customs Organization in Brussels, Belgium. The theme of this session was "Partnership, Prioritization and Information Sharing - Key Factors on Global Law Enforcement." There were approximately 180 different Customs officers and officials representing agencies from throughout the world at this session.

In March of 2009, **Director Forman** spoke at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 9th Annual Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference, in New York, NY. She was on a panel on "Law Enforcement and Suspicious Activity Reporting." This panel discussed case studies, how suspicious activity reports are used by law enforcement, and the latest trends in money laundering.

Dr. Robin McFee was appointed to two prestigious positions: Chair of the WMD special interest section of the American Academy of Clinical Toxicology; and Co-Chair of the WMD Symposium for the 2009 North American Congress of Clinical Toxicology. She was also interviewed on healthcare facility security, preparedness planning and response for "Directions," quarterly publication of the International Association for Healthcare Security and Safety (IAHSS). The publication date: April 2009. She was also interviewed on the radio talk show "Savage Nation," discussing toxic and dangerous imports."

A paper that she co-wrote, entitled "Death by Polonium: Lessons learned from the murder of former Soviet agent Alexander Litvinenko," was published in [Response Guide for Chemical and Radiologic Threats](#), published by Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS) November 2008 18-23.

Profile: Insp. Kevin D. Eack, Senior Terrorism Advisor for the Illinois State Police

Inspector Kevin D. Eack is the Senior Terrorism Advisor for the Illinois State Police where he is in charge of the Office of Counter Terrorism. In that capacity, he oversees and coordinates homeland security programs for state and local law enforcement in Illinois. He represents the Illinois State Police on the Illinois Terrorism Task Force (ITTF), serving on the Crisis Response and Prevention Committee. He also serves on the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS) Board, the law enforcement mutual aid system for Illinois. He is a member of the Chicago and Springfield FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive Boards.

In 1983 he received a Juris Doctorate degree, and is admitted to practice law before the Illinois Supreme Court, U.S. District Court of Illinois, and the U.S. Supreme Court. From 1983-85 he served as a Special Agent for the FBI, where he received a commendation from Director William H. Webster. He then returned to Illinois where he served four years as a state prosecutor. In 2004 he received a Master's Degree from the Institute for Labor & Industrial Relations, University of Illinois. In March, 2007 he received a Master's Degree in Homeland Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security where he is the President of the Alumni Board of Directors to the Center.

In 2004 he co-founded the Midwest Homeland Security Consortium, an organization comprised of state and local counter terrorism units and fusion center commanders. This group has now grown to represent 12 Midwest states and several major cities for the purpose of strengthening regional collaboration, and providing a state and local perspective to the FBI and Department of Homeland Security. He presently serves as chair.

He has been selected by the Department of Homeland Security and the National Governors Association to serve on several technical working groups and advisory panels on homeland security matters. He has been a speaker at several institutions including Northwestern University, University of Illinois, Southern Illinois University School of Law, University of Connecticut, and the U.S. State Department's International Police Academy. He also received an appointment to the University of Chicago at Argonne National Laboratory while preparing his NPS master's thesis on *Securing Nuclear and Radiological Materials in the Homeland*. In 2008 he served on a mission trip to Poland for the National Guard Bureau providing technical guidance and assistance to the Polish National Police in homeland security. Most recently, he was selected for a fellowship with the FBI in the counter terrorism program where is presently serving in Washington, D.C.

Profile: Joseph J. Gulinello, ASIS Council Vice President

Joseph J. Gulinello has been appointed the ASIS Council Vice President overseeing this Council.

A retired NYPD Detective who served in the elite Crime Scene and Emergency Service Units, Joe has been inducted into the NYPD Honor Legion.

He is an Adjunct Professor at two colleges: the Homeland Security and Criminal Justice Programs at St. John's University; and in the Administrative Science Program at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

He held several top positions in security as: President of Integrated Security Solutions; Vice President of Securitas Security Services, Senior Director Corporate Security of the NYC Health and Hospitals Corporation; and Manager for the Loews Corporation.

He is a retired LTC - USAR and served in various command, staff and educator positions. His last assignment was Director of Faculty – Army Command and General Staff College for NY, NJ and Canada.

He is a graduate of John Jay College of Criminal Justice with an MPA, and BA in Criminal Psychology. He is also a graduate of the Army CGSC.

He has been a member of ASIS for 30 years and has also served as Council Chair, Vice Chair and member of the Healthcare Security Council.

Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Daunting Task Gets Even Harder (continued from page 1)

In December 2008 the Bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released *The World at Risk Report* (WaR report), a 160-page document (available in <http://www.preventwmd.gov/report/>. It is also in bookstores).

The WaR report is a culmination of their six-month investigation and threat assessment. Their purpose was to increase awareness about the potential availability of WMD. They discuss the key threats the US and the world face, and outline strategies to address our vulnerabilities and reduce the likelihood of WMD attacks. It is worth reading.

In the next few pages, we'll look at threats and vulnerabilities, as well as suggested approaches, through the eyes of the WaR Report commission, your humble correspondent and other experts.

INTENT OF THE REPORT

“The intent of this report is neither to frighten nor to reassure the American people about the current state of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is to underscore that the U.S. government has yet to fully adapt to these circumstances and to convey the sobering reality that the risks are growing faster than our multilayered defenses. Our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. We need unity at all levels – nationally, locally and among people all across the globe. There is still time to defend ourselves if we act with the urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us. Sounding that call for urgent action is the purpose of this report.”

The World at Risk Commission chose to emphasize two of the CBRNE categories – biological weapons and nuclear threats – based upon the potential impact in terms of deaths that these pose compared to the other. While we can argue that over 80% of terrorist events involved explosives, and chemicals have been used from Iran-Iraq on the battlefield and Tokyo in terrorist attacks, the ultimate potential of a propagated contagion or thermonuclear device clearly trump the others.

However, in an era of competing demands, preparedness follows leadership – chemical weapons remain a dangerous threat and easier commodity to create, divert.

The report provides 12 recommendations: 2 are focused solely on biological weapons, 3 focus on nuclear and 2 others address both nuclear and biological. We'll focus primarily on the nuclear threat.

WMD – RADIATION/NUCLEAR

Clearly the nightmare scenario is a terrorist unleashing a thermonuclear device in a major US city.

The Commission provides an overview of the nuclear players and wannabes internationally, hot spots of risk, critical vulnerabilities including past thefts of nuclear materials – some conducted with great skill and audacity, others walking out of the candy store uninterrupted.

Among the several recommended actions devoted to the nuclear threat, some very specific ones warrant highlighting:

1. Increasing support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
2. The US should orchestrate international consensus to block additional countries from obtaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.

The IAEA is an important – yet undermanned and underfunded – organization. Clearly annual inspections are inadequate against the backdrop of increased nuclear players and those that want to go nuclear. There are too many players and materials for this organization in its current form to handle the threat. That a weapon wasn't made despite Iran having far more material than originally reported is fortuitous. But hope and luck are not strategies.

From Africa to Eastern Europe to Central Asia – raw materials to nuclear facilities – opportunities sources for diversion. Given the fact that the US Government has announced delays in implementing the total radiation scanning of ports, our vulnerabilities here and abroad remain.

Progress, of course, is being made across agencies and globally through collaboration, increased intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and the all-important improving partnerships between private security and governments. Recognizing private industry security represents a sizable preparedness resource. And an important set of eyes, ears and boots on the ground, such collaborations are vital to enhance preparedness.

A flaw in the report is that the Commission opted to not include radiological threats as a high focus area. And herein lies one of the challenges in preparedness – defining the magnitude of threat based upon which metrics?

A simple medical device theft of cesium resulted in a widespread event, led to several deaths, hundreds of patients and tens of thousands tested for radiation in Brazil. There have been numerous reports where simple radioactive materials have been used to poison or scare.

Consider the public concern in London when Litvinenko was poisoned and the perpetrators left trace amounts of polonium. We can debate whether dispersed radioactive materials are a big threat as portrayed in the film “Dirty Bomb”. Nevertheless, securing these materials should be a priority; one that continues to remain elusive. The 2008 DHS (effective 2009) initiative to secure easy access radiological materials is a start.

Clearly nuclear weapons – the image of a device imported into the US and detonated at a public event or strategic location a la the Tom Clancy book “The Sum of all Fears” – remain the Holy Grail for Al Qaeda, but there are others with similar intent.

We live in a world of increasing levels of asymmetric warfare and growing numbers of disenfranchised groups that readily turn to violence as a problem-solver. In the aftermath of 911, the boundaries of “extreme” have been blurred or removed according to Rolf Larssen – Director, Office of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Department of Energy.

He continues to frame the nuclear issue not just in terms of the atom as an immediate weapon, but as a source of energy, deterrence and prestige. Obtaining it allows a state and non-state actor to wield disproportionate power and influence. He asserts that nearly any modern industrial state has the ability to develop the technological infrastructure or illicitly acquire the specific components to build a nuclear weapon. Iran is a clear example of this. With Russia as advisor, source of nuclear expertise and technology, and partners in energy ventures, the collaboration has clearly enhanced Iran’s influence and stature in the region.

Though often ignored, the caveat not to underestimate the ability of a developing nation or terrorist group to obtain nuclear technology is often ignored. But with almost 300 small-scale nuclear research reactors in over 50 countries – the opportunity for accident, diversion of materials or intentional retasking to a different use is growing. The US cannot secure our Southern borders to crime, drugs or illegal aliens; consider the potential for other threats.

One of the most poignant comments from Commissioner Mike Sheehan at a recent WaR Commission conference was the notion that if you have the materials – radiological, biological or chemical (industrial, research or weapons) you own the challenge and have the duty to secure those items or lose them. It’s not a money thing, but an obligation and responsibility that your company, university or industry must live up to.

From a domestic security perspective, unlike the nuclear industry which is inculcated with a sense of concern and has a ‘security culture mentality’ – clearly desirable in this era – the academic and bioscience communities reflect a philosophy that promotes free exchange of scientific information. The notion of restricting materials, research or movement of scientists is anathema to much of the biology culture.

Consider that during the 1930’s and 1940’s nuclear scientists freely shared their discoveries, even while knowing on some level that governments were as interested in these revelations for weapons purposes. No one can put the nuclear genie back in the bottle, but scientists – unwitting actors in the WMD reality – play an important and available vulnerability as some will work for the highest bidders. Consider Khan and his network which enabled Pakistan to go nuclear. It can and is happening again. Biological weapons are poor man’s nukes, and they are much easier to obtain right now.

Russia is rarely forthcoming about anything relating to their security; their biological and nuclear programs placed in a black box surrounded by military and security protections. For the sake of limiting WMD proliferation – especially biological and nuclear agents, it is critical to collaborate with Russia, or curtail, contain and counter their threat. However, relying upon a nation that aggressively guards its secrets, even while not necessarily protecting its facilities, is a weakness in global limitation of WMD diversion, theft or proliferation.

Given that Russia has its own global aspirations and agenda, finding common ground will be a challenge. Not being able to adequately peek into the black box may be our ultimate vulnerability – underscoring the vital need to protect and increase our human intelligence capabilities – a suggestion supported by virtually all members of the WaR Report Conference held in New York this January.

And the sad reality – if a biological or nuclear event occurred, according to the WaR Report, after action reports of TOPOFF (pick a number) and other exercises – our preparedness has fallen off. Failure to communicate across performance cultures – unfamiliarity with the capabilities of disparate responder agencies – local, regional, federal, LEO and non – as well as delays in deploying vital materials persist.

Training and interest have fallen off, too. Preparedness planning has remained stagnant as companies recycle ones made in the 911 flurry of preparedness efforts. The Journal of Emergency Medical Services (JEMS) conducted two online surveys to assess first responder readiness. In the first, their readers were asked if they thought they or their EMS agencies could effectively handle a victim of a “dirty” bomb – 82% said “no!” The second survey asked if respondents had a pandemic flu plan. Only about 25% said “yes.” Clearly, across the preparedness spectrum, we have work to do.

Some of these are readily remedied. When it hits the fan, that’s not the time to exchange business cards! We can promote greater collaboration between government and private security and across responder cultures. We can inculcate a culture of security. We have to, especially in this economic climate – as a matter of duty even in the absence of government support.

DISCUSSION

Some of the recommendations rely upon international cooperation, especially with Russia and China. Given that both nations have a vested interest in limiting US influence as well as WMD proliferation – some might argue objectives at odds with themselves – and recognizing both countries have strong ties to Iran and other nations interested in advancing their nuclear capabilities, such cooperation may continue to be tenuous.

Putting the genie back into the bottle is easier said than done. Nevertheless, trying to find common ground, or parlaying something we have that others want, in exchange for limiting WMD proliferation is a policy worth continuing. So far, we have had some success in limiting the spread of nuclear materials. As Russia produces much of the world’s polonium and the US is conveniently one of the largest purchasers, some sort of balance is being achieved. But it doesn’t take much to make a weapon, and materials have been stolen in amounts that come close to that needed for a device.

It can be argued that Pakistan is at least partially an extremist regime. According to the Bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, “Were one to map terrorism and WMD, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.”

Iran, with a nuclear weapon, is a game changer in the Middle East and globally. They are already a major arms supplier in the region, working through and for Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as insurgents in Iraq. To date, these have been conventional weapons. Possessing even the most rudimentary-improvised nuclear device would embolden an already aggressive regime dedicated to restoring the Khomeini Revolution.

The “Iran effect” is keenly felt in the Middle East and likely behind the 2006 conflict in Lebanon and 2008-09 Gaza events. Clearly, any progress made between Israel – a country Ahmadinejad and his ilk have sworn to destroy – and moderate Arab regimes or the West Bank, is likely to be threatened by Iran. Their extremism is threatening the efforts and successes of the more moderate players.

Iran and Pakistan thus pose a sizable risk as havens for radical Islamists and the potential for diversion of nuclear materials or weapons. The list of threats we face and the sponsors, suppliers or seekers of those threats is growing, and with it, important implications for security professionals.

Another area of concern is the expectation that somehow the clock can be turned back in Iran, North Korea and other regimes led by folks committed to acquiring a military or power advantage. Iran has advanced nuclear material processing in a few well-protected underground facilities; their desire for nuclear power is unwavering. Although clearly we cannot toss in the towel and need to use every resource at our disposal, it must be tempered by the reality that Russia and China have a vested interest in Iran.

They also recommend that the intelligence community needs to upgrade their science and technology expertise especially as it pertains to WMD. Their suggestion that our law enforcement

and intelligence organizations increase their interaction with the scientific community, as well as continue recruiting expertise in WMD, is insightful and important. But that pesky set of details – corporate cultures, historic rivalries and economics – all must be managed if progress is to continue.

The Commission is correct that we cannot afford to regress, and, in fact, must now more than ever redouble our efforts and commitment in people, money and programming, but we need to do it more focused and smarter. The unwieldy bureaucracy at the federal level engaged in and overseeing this entity called “preparedness” needs to be streamlined.

Of great concern to preparedness professionals, and likely the readers of this newsletter, is the thought process of many Americans – a widespread disconnect between global events and domestic security, including the notion that economic issues are distinct and unrelated from threats to the homeland. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Global events – from combative or competitive nations - can and do affect us on a daily basis, from impacting our personal income, to our security.

The U.S. is in a period of **9/11 amnesia**, and the more removed we are from 2001 without a successful attack against us, the less intense public concern will be. Yet we know there have been foiled attacks against the homeland. Clearly, the task before us as preparedness professionals is to keep the public aware of the threat – not to foment fear, but to foster continued support and efforts to enhancing threat reduction and capacity to handle a likely future terrorist attack. Virtually every panelist agreed we need to engage, educate and empower the public. While they agree the report underscores that, more specifics are needed. They also offer insights on the info breakdown:

“Once the misstep of duct tape and plastic sheets occurred, the government pulled back instead of having an adult conversation and engaging the public. And we need to do it in a non-threatening way. We need to include civic society. We need to develop greater resilience.”

CONCLUSION

According to Asst. Secretary of Defense Vickers, he considers “the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as the most dangerous threat.” Terrorist groups worldwide remain intent upon acquiring WMD – whether biological, chemical or some form of nuclear weapon. Al Qaeda has made no secret of their fatwa, their imperative to obtain WMD especially a nuclear device. But they aren’t the only group or adversary seeking the competitive advantage that such weapons confer. Given there are more than 60 countries harboring some form of terrorist threat – the array of resources required to minimize the threat from scientific, intelligence, law enforcement, military, economic and responder capabilities – is enormous.

The Commission undertook an important project – to raise awareness about the global threats biological and nuclear/radiological weapons pose to the world *and* courageously put forth recommendations, some politically or institutionally delicate ones, to thwart the risks. Then there’s the ubiquitous “but”...All government reports are like bikinis; what they reveal is interesting, what they hide is essential. The World at Risk Report (WAR) is no different. However it provides a concise explanation of the problem and, in the broad strokes, shares some useful starting points to addressing the problem.

One of the challenges with preparedness – and there are many – where do you put the emphasis? Prevention? Interdiction? Response? Mitigation?

And, there is a great disparity in the level and quality of preparedness nationwide towards chemicals, biologicals, and radiological weapons.

Some of the most insightful recommendations from homeland security experts and members of the WaR Commission Conference:

1. Continue building our human intelligence capability
2. Engage the public in preparedness
 - a. Increase public resilience through information, not fear

3. Develop a culture of security, not paranoia; but security across industries and communities
 - a. Inculcate the notion that it is our duty to protect dangerous materials that we work with
4. Continue putting pressure on terrorist groups here and abroad, including the nations that harbor or support them
5. We must engage Russia on issues of common importance if any likelihood of their assisting in reducing WMD proliferation is to be expected
6. Pakistan is one of the most critical vulnerabilities – possessing nuclear weapons that could fall into terrorist hands if greater political/military instability occurs

George Santayana said it best: “those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it.”

If terrorism is one of the defining issues of the early 21st century, then Weapons of Mass Destruction remain one of the demons inherited from the 20th century. Whether biological weapons, chemicals or nuclear, numerous nations are engaged in developing or possess old stockpiles of these agents.

It is a daunting task to protect the nation. But the good news – we’re all stakeholders. And the American people remain a force for good, are decent and still strong. A good renewal point to enhance preparedness and a cure for 9/11 amnesia is to read the World At Risk Report.

The WMD Commission has reminded us of the threats. But their efforts are only the beginning. The greatest risk would be to think the job is done. The toughest part will be implementing the recommendations. That starts with commitment, collaboration and consistent efforts. Preparedness is a process, not an event.

Dr. Robin McFee, a Council member, is former director, Center for Bioterrorism Preparedness (CBPREP), medical toxicologist, consults with industry, healthcare and government organizations on wide range of preparedness issues, including WMD, pandemics, corporate, travel health security and emerging threats. She co-authored *The Handbook of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Agent Exposures*, and *The Textbook of Toxic-Terrorism*.

Council Members

Council Chair - Michael Bouchard, CPP, is the Corporate Security Manager for EOD Technology. He retired after 20 years of service as Assistant Director with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and previously served as a police officer in Connecticut. He is active in a number of professional organizations including IACP, IAAI, IAEM, PERF and INSA.

Council Vice-Chair - Colonel (Retired) Brittain P. Mallow is a Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement practitioner with over 31 years of combined public and private sector experience. A career Middle Eastern Area Specialist and student of the region, he is conversant in Arabic language, culture and politics, and has served multiple tours in the Middle East. Britt is a Principal Analyst with MITRE Corporation where he supports national security efforts. The MITRE Corporation is a not-for-profit organization chartered to work in the public interest, serving US Government sponsors.

Paul H. Aubé, CPP, CAS, has been in the security field since 1989. He holds a B.Sc. in security management from Montreal University. The former Director of Security at Concordia University in Montreal, he has also managed the security contract and operations function at the U.S. Consulate in Montreal, acted as security shift commander for the City of Montreal's Security Division and was the Security Manager at Groupe TVA, the television holding of Quebecor Media. He is currently Director of Corporate and Community Security for Federation CJA in Montreal.

Courtney B. Banks is the founder and CEO of Nat'l Security Associates Worldwide (NSAWW), a national security business consulting firm where she advises companies on business development within the homeland security, homeland defense, law enforcement and combating terrorism arenas. Ms. Banks has nearly two decades of experience within these fields, stemming from posts at the White House, the Pentagon, and as an executive officer in several Fortune 100 defense-contracting companies.

Douglas Callen is President, Douglas I Callen and Associates, a security consulting company specializing in homeland security and business development with federal, state and local law enforcement and security markets. Doug's background includes 21 years as a Special Agent with the U.S. Secret Service, Director of Intelligence and National Security Advisor to the Secretary of Transportation, and most recently as the Chief Security Officer for the Transportation Security Administration, DHS.

Mark A. Camillo is Director, Business Development, Integrated Systems & Global Services for the Lockheed Martin Corporation. Mark had a distinguished 21-year career as a Special Agent in the U.S. Secret Service, including three separate assignments at the White House, and serving as the agency's Deputy Assistant Director and as its Chief Technology Officer. He held several key positions during his career in major event planning, including being appointed the Olympic Coordinator for the 2002 Salt Lake Winter Olympics.

Ted Cromwell is the Senior Director of Security and Operations at the American Chemistry Council in Arlington, VA where he has lead responsibility for chemical facility security, chemical weapons convention implementation, drug enforcement issues and export controls. He works closely with the Department of Homeland Security on both regulatory and voluntary security initiatives that impact the chemical sector. Ted also serves on the executive committee of the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC) and is assistant chair of the Council. CSCC advises DHS on numerous crosscutting security initiatives for this critical infrastructure.

Deena Disraelly is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses specializing in education, modeling, policy, and consequence management in the military and civilian sectors. She is also a doctoral candidate at The George Washington University focusing on improved community preparedness and disaster response. She has eight years of experience as a Naval Nuclear Engineer and a background in security, public affairs, and emergency exercise, education and training.

Jim Dunne has been a member of the Council since 2002. He is a senior analyst in the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and occasionally lectures at the George Washington University. He holds a Master's Degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and holds the designation of Certified Protection Professional from ASIS International.

Inspector Kevin D. Eack is the Senior Terrorism Advisor for the Illinois State Police where he is in charge of the Office of Counter Terrorism. He received a Juris Doctorate degree in 1983, and served as a Special Agent for the FBI. In 2007 he received a Master's Degree in Homeland Security Studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security.

Olle Fjordgren, Chief Executive Officer of Fjordgren Konsult AB, has worked in more than 25 countries. He has been advisor to the governments of Ethiopia, Pakistan and Mongolia and worked with Mujahedin in Afghanistan during the war with Soviet Union. He holds a Masters of Science from UCLA and the designation of Certified Protection Professional from ASIS International.

Marcy M. Forman is the Director of the Office of Investigations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and oversees the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, with more than 8,000 employees to include over 6,200 Special Agents, assigned to 26 Special Agent-in-Charge offices in major cities, and 181 other field offices throughout the United States, and administers a budget of more than \$1.6 billion. As Director, Ms. Forman is responsible for strategic planning, national policy implementation, and the development and execution of operational initiatives spanning the five major investigative program divisions within the Office of Investigations: National Security Investigations; Financial, Narcotics and Public Safety Investigations; Critical Infrastructure Protection and Fraud Investigations; Investigative Services; and Policy and Emergency Preparedness

Jack L. Johnson, Jr., is a Partner in the Washington Federal Practice at PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. Formerly the first Chief Security Officer (CSO) for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), he is a nationally and internationally

recognized figure who serves as an industry consultant on a variety of security, law enforcement, risk management and intelligence related matters. He routinely testifies before Congress on homeland security and national security related issues and is a frequent speaker at many national and international conferences, seminars and symposiums.

Dr. Vahid Majidi is the FBI's Assistant Director for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. The Directorate is responsible for coordinating and managing FBI's equities, activities, and investigations involving WMD. Dr. Majidi came to the FBI from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), where he served as the Chemistry Division Leader. Prior to his career at LANL, Dr. Majidi was a tenured associate professor of chemistry at the University of Kentucky. His research activities focused on analytical spectroscopy and gas-phase chemistry. Dr. Majidi earned his BS degree in chemistry from Eastern Michigan University and his PhD from Wayne State University. After his graduate work, he spent two years as a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Texas (Austin).

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