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**Global Terrorism, Political Instability and  
International Crime Council  
November 2008**

This edition of the newsletter of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council features the following articles:

- **Council member Kevin D. Eack discusses new trends in state and local fusion issues (See below).**
- **Council member Marcy Forman outlines dynamic new ICE initiatives to combat product counterfeiting. (See page 2)**
- **Council Chair Michael R. Bouchard presents the Council's achievements in 2008 and plans for 2009. (See page 3)**
- **New Council member Olle Fjordgren reminisces about an international career of service and adventure. (See page 3)**

**State and Local Fusion Centers: Enhancing  
National Efforts Against Terrorism**

**By Kevin D. Eack**

Some have compared the proliferation of state and local fusion centers and efforts to partner them with the intelligence community, to organizing a new little league baseball team. As the analogy goes, each center has a different set of skills, abilities and equipment. (1)

In fact, what many people overlook is that many states have had a centralized intelligence system of some sort for decades.

Typically, these have been housed in state police agencies as a central repository on intelligence related to violent gangs, drug trafficking, prostitution, child exploitation, weapons smuggling, theft rings, and other crimes. In those states with a major city or county police department, those agencies have also operated an intelligence unit. So, for many states, today's fusion center is simply an extension of those intelligence units, with a higher degree of vertical (federal intelligence community) and horizontal (state/local) collaboration. Some have compared today's fusion centers with "state police intelligence units on steroids". (2)

(Continued on Page 4)

<sup>1</sup> Mathew M. Johnson, "Number of Databases Boggling Down Fusion Centers", *Congressional Quarterly*, October 9, 2007 (accessed November 10, 2007 at [www.cq.com](http://www.cq.com)).

<sup>2</sup> Todd Masse and John Rollins, "A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress", Congressional Research Service, September 19, 2007.

# Combating The Rise In Product Counterfeits: The Growing Impact of the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center

By Marcy M. Forman, Director, Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

- It is Christmas Eve. Everyone is sound asleep in your home when suddenly you are startled by sirens screaming down your street. You look outside and see your neighbor's house in flames. The next day, investigators discover the cord for the lights on your neighbor's Christmas tree had non-compliant and substandard wiring. The UL tag that usually inspires consumer confidence in the safety of the product was counterfeit.
- It is a typical evening at home. You are getting the kids ready for bed, squeezing the toothpaste on their brushes, when you get a whiff of an odor that is familiar, but not for this time or place. You feel the panic as you finally recognize the smell - antifreeze. You look closer at the box and discover typographical errors that you would not expect from Colgate.

These chilling but all too real scenes focus on just two of the many illegally imported items that the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) has found being sold in the United States.

The impact of IPR crime is significant. Estimates by industry and trade associations indicate U.S. businesses lose as much as \$250 billion annually to counterfeiting and piracy. But as great as the monetary loss is, the injury to technology and trade competitiveness suffered by U.S. trademark and copyright owners is immeasurable. However, the impact is not limited to the business community. As the scenes above illustrate, IPR crime poses a direct threat to the health and safety of all Americans.

The IPR Center is the U.S. government's response to the growing problem of IPR crime. The mission of the IPR Center is, "To ensure national security by protecting the health and safety of the United States public, and stopping predatory and unfair trade practices that threaten the global economy."

Led by the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the IPR Center is a partnership in action, bringing together the leading federal agencies fighting IPR crime: ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Food and Drug Administration's Office of Criminal Investigation, the Department of Justice Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Department of Commerce. Together, these agencies work to provide a comprehensive response to this growing problem.

Highlighting the success of the interagency model, the IPR Center received information from the ICE attaché office in Hong Kong regarding melamine-tainted food products.

Immediately, the IPR Center coordinated a government-wide effort to identify, interdict, and investigate several shipments of tainted products that arrived in the United States. Through the combined efforts of the various agencies at the IPR Center, the tainted goods were kept out of stores and off the tables of the American public.

At the July 2008 dedication ceremony for the new IPR Center, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff offered remarks on the IPR crime and the Center, saying, "Intellectual property rights crimes are increasing in volume and complexity, costing legitimate companies and their hard-working employees billions in irreplaceable revenue. These crimes threaten the health and safety of American consumers, and put illicit funds in the hands of criminals here, as well as unknown recipients overseas. This Center will fuse federal resources and promote partnerships with industry in new and powerful ways to protect American business and consumers from falling victim to dangerous and illicit goods." (Continued on page 7)

# **Goals, Objectives and Accomplishments of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council**

**By Michael R. Bouchard, Council Chair**

The past year has been busy for the council. We added three new council members and one committee member. As of January 2009, the council has 19 members and one committee member.

The goals of the council this year fit the strategic plans of ASIS International. One of our main objectives was to improve our communication with other councils, chapters and the general membership. We constantly try to educate the membership about the capabilities of the council, which has been accomplished through our newsletter and more interaction at chapter meetings. As a result of our outreach efforts this year, we saw much more interaction between council members and the local chapters.

Our quarterly newsletter, managed by Mario Possamai, is designed to inform the membership about our capabilities, as well as our accomplishments. In each edition, we profile at least one council member, with the intent of giving the membership an insight into the expertise we have on our council. Our goal is to make ourselves available to the membership whenever they need us.

As a component of our goal to provide quality education and training, we offered several opportunities. The council sponsored three sessions at the Annual conference in Atlanta, and presented at a number of conferences around the world. In March 2008, we sponsored the 26<sup>th</sup> annual Global Terrorism Spring Conference. We offered 11 sessions at this conference, which offered a variety of interesting topics about what keeps the security professional up at night. While the attendance was relatively low, the reviews by those who attended were favorable. Each year, we take the information you give us and design our next conference based on your needs and input.

We have several active council members who regularly participate in book reviews. Their assistance is greatly appreciated.

In the upcoming year, we hope to improve our interaction with the other councils and chapters. We are certainly open to your suggestions, so please contact us if you have any ideas.

## **From Vanersbog, Sweden to the Sudan, China and Beyond**

### **Council member Olle Fjordgren reminisces about an international career of service and adventure**

I was born 5th February 1954 in Vanersborg, Sweden. I went through all the normal stuff in my childhood and adolescent days and moved to Gothenburg when I was 18 to study at the university. I started to study engineering but the math killed me. So I changed to oceanography, geography, and finally settled for geology.

When I was 22 and almost done with my MSc, I got a job offer to prospect for industrial minerals in Sudan for a Sudanese company.

The offer reached me on 31st December and I had to fly out 4th January.

I made the plane!

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# State and Local Fusion Centers: Emerging Trends and Issues (Cont'd from page 1)

## Counter Terrorism: Not a New Mission for State and Local Law Enforcement

For those who have been in law enforcement, none of this should be particularly surprising. To say that state and local law enforcement may play a role in homeland defense and security is sort of like suggesting that dairy products play a role in ice cream. There have been a number of recent examples where state and local law enforcement have played a key role in detecting terrorist activity. A simple traffic stop of a subject on April 19, 1995, by an Oklahoma state trooper for driving a vehicle without a license plate resulted in the arrest of Timothy McVeigh for the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building. On April 4, 1980, the deadly FALN, a small, heavily armed terrorist organization responsible for over 100 bombings in major cities including Chicago, New York and Miami suffered their most serious setback when they were arrested by patrolmen in Evanston, Illinois as they assembled in a park with several stolen vehicles, 13 weapons, disguises and false identifications, preparing to heist an armored truck at the prestigious Northwestern University.

Terrorism isn't new to state and local law enforcement. This type of terrorism is new to all of us, and law enforcement is adjusting to a new enemy with new methods. Law enforcement is also adjusting to new operational issues with which it has not had to contend before.

According to Congressional testimony these include:

1. The absence of a cohesive federal strategy regarding information sharing;
2. Too many federal information sharing networks;
3. An inability or unwillingness on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to work effectively together; (3)

From a State and local law enforcement perspective, one example of an obstacle created by the lack of coordination between the DHS and FBI is security clearances. State and local fusion centers are required to have security clearances in order to receive, analyze, store and disseminate classified material. Yet, in many cases, it is reported the FBI is unwilling to accept those with DHS security clearances. In still others, DHS requires verification that someone from a state or major city possesses an FBI clearance through a process where the clearance is "passed" to DHS from FBI. Such problems can prove to be quite frustrating to state and local partners who are doing all they can to play a role in homeland security.

Another example is mission overlap between the DHS and FBI. A primary mission for many state and local fusion centers is collecting, analyzing and disseminating critical infrastructure data to the DHS. Since September 11, 2001, DHS has conducted several data calls in order to populate the national critical infrastructure database. It has also adopted the ACAMS system from Los Angeles Police Department as a nationwide system to manage this data, urging state fusion centers to obtain training in this system.

The FBI operates a critical infrastructure protection program of its own called Infraguard, which is quite popular in some states among the private stakeholders. This presents a number of challenges for state and local fusion centers, which often find themselves "caught in the middle", trying to show a cooperative spirit between both agencies, while also trying to maintain credibility with their private stakeholders who own, operate and protect critical infrastructure. Those in the

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<sup>3</sup> Mathew M. Johnson, "Number of Databases Boggling Down Fusion Centers", *Congressional Quarterly*, October 9, 2007 (accessed November 1, 2007 at [www.cq.com](http://www.cq.com)). See also, General Accounting Office, *Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers*, GAO -08-35, October, 2007 (accessed November 5, 2007 at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0835.pdf>).

private sector often complain that the “federal government needs to get its act together” on this important issue soon, as it often appears to be disjointed, and uncoordinated. (4)

According to some state and local stakeholders who operate fusion centers, they often find themselves biting their tongues. On the one hand, fusion centers want to get along with the FBI and DHS. The FBI is a critical partner, and DHS provides needed funding. According to one state fusion center commander, “we are anticipating this to be very challenging.”(5)

As a recent Congressional report points out, the evolution of state and local fusion centers leaves a number of issues looming. One issue is that many state and local fusion centers are not familiar with civil liberties issues and the federal regulations regarding intelligence. As a result, more privacy concerns are likely to develop due to increased violations of intelligence rules. A second issue is that as more time passes since the U.S. has faced a terrorist threat in the homeland, support for these centers on the part of state and local governments will fade, causing personnel and resources to be shifted to other initiatives. A related issue is funding. Congress provided substantial funding to DHS during the first few years following September 11, 2001, however as more time passes, such funding may taper off, leaving less and less funding with which states and local governments may operate the fusion centers. (6)

One of the most significant issues found in the Congressional research has been the absence of a well-defined long-term role for state and local fusion centers. According to testimony by Eileen Larence, Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues, “...the federal government has not clearly articulated the long term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through an information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments.”(7)

According to Congressional findings, there are currently 58 fusion centers at the state and local level. Forty-three are considered operational, while 15 are in various stages of development. Nine centers opened shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Thirty-four became operational after January 2004. At least thirty-four fusion centers report having federal personnel working in them. (8)

While many efforts have been made by the federal government to support fusion centers, many fusion center officials report challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. The FBI’s LEO system and DHS’ HSIN are mentioned prominently in the Congressional reports. These multiple systems are reported to be causing “information overload” at many centers, often with redundant information. (9)

For many fusion center officials at the state and local level, the single biggest concern is sustainability. Van Godsey, Director of the Missouri Information and Analysis Center (MIAC) states it this way, “With this tremendous focus on fusion centers, my concern is sustainability of these centers and the national effort. Currently, any federal funding for fusion centers is located within the federal allocation to the states. The use of these funds is subject to local demands, politics and views that may not always be supportive of the fusion center effort. If the federal government is going to look at the fusion centers and expect minimum capabilities, then I believe there is going to have to be controls to ensure a minimum level of funding.” Godsey advocates a specific line item funding to the states for fusion centers instead of the present method of funding. (10)

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<sup>4</sup> Michael Crane, Vice President and General Counsel for IPC International, a private security firm providing guards at most major malls in the U.S., interview by author November 26, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Major Monte McKee, Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, interview by author November 26, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Todd Masse and John Rollins; “A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress”, *Congressional Research Service*, September 19, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Eileen R. Larence, *Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-07-1241T.*, September 27, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Larence, 8.

<sup>10</sup> Director Van Godsey, Missouri Information and Analysis Center, interview by author November 26, 2007.

As Congressional reports point out, ultimately the federal government needs to make a policy decision about the future of state and local fusion centers. As one report states, a number of questions need to be answered including the following:

1. Do fusion centers solve the pre-9/11 information sharing problems, and as such, make Americans safer?
2. Can fusion centers work if they aren't part of an integrated philosophy of intelligence and security?
3. Who benefits from fusion centers? Who should staff, fund, and oversee them? What role, if any, should fusion centers play in the Intelligence Community (IC)? What role should federal agencies play in fusion centers to include funding?
4. Is some basic level of common standards necessary in order for fusion centers to offer a national benefit? Does the federal government have an integrated national fusion center strategy? How is their performance to be measured?
5. Is the current configuration of 40 plus fusion centers, with multiple centers in some states, the most efficient way to structure them? (11)

## **2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing**

The recent issuance of the National Strategy for Information Sharing in October 2007 certainly supports Congressional earlier findings that federal leadership, with regard to fusion centers, is needed. (12) Referencing Guideline 2 of the President's December 16, 2006 Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, the strategy calls for a "common framework" be developed governing the roles and responsibilities between the federal government, and state, local, and tribal governments, and private sector entities. (13)

The strategy also acknowledges the important role of state and local fusion centers as follows, "State and major urban area fusion centers are vital assets critical to sharing information related to terrorism. They will serve as the primary focal points within the State and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related information."(14)

The strategy also contemplates how state and local fusion centers may scrub and further disseminate terrorism related intelligence to others in the region by indicating, "Federal departments and agencies will provide terrorism – related information to State, local, and tribal authorities primarily through these fusion centers. Unless specifically prohibited by law, or subject to security classification restrictions, these fusion centers may further customize such information for dissemination to satisfy intra- or inter State needs."(15)

Additionally, the strategy addresses the important issue of public and private collaboration to protect critical infrastructure, stating, "This Strategy builds on these efforts to adopt an effective framework that ensures a two-way flow of timely and actionable security information between public and private partners." It also acknowledges the sensitive of critical infrastructure information provided by the private sector, and the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of such data when it is provided to governmental units. (16)

## **Conclusion**

With proper support and guidance to state and local fusion centers, one can easily imagine a time when the U.S. has a significantly stronger situational awareness within its borders than we presently have today. To be sure, there are many issues in the road ahead. Staffing, training,

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<sup>11</sup> Todd Masse and John Rollins; "A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress", *Congressional Research Service*, September 19, 2007 p4.

<sup>12</sup> *National Strategy for Information Sharing, October 2007* (accessed November 5, 2007 at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing>).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 20.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

intelligence handling procedures, benchmark capabilities, and sustained funding are among those issues. However, from the perspective of state and local fusion centers, great strides are being made in creating a lasting fabric across the nation with which terrorism-related threat intelligence can be effectively shared. In some cases, that capability extends to “all crimes” and “all hazards”. Those in the intelligence community who may have first doubted these centers would ever play a role in our national security, now see these fusion centers gaining in strength and sophistication. In some cases, these centers are breaking new ground developing new and innovative methods for effective intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. It is important to remember that state and local law enforcement have always had a public safety mission dating back to the first county sheriffs. Given the tragic events of September 11, 2001, no one should underestimate the resolve and determination of state and local public safety agencies to do their part in keeping America safe.

*Council member Kevin D. Eack made this presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security 2008 Annual Conference.*

## **Combating The Rise In Product Counterfeits: The Growing Impact of the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (Cont'd from page 2)**

The IPR Center is a “One Stop Shop” for both law enforcement and the private sector. The Center is organized into three units that address the growing transnational threat:

- The Operations Unit initiates and conducts proactive investigations and prosecutions from the Center; de-conflicts leads developed by law enforcement, industry, and the public; forwards actionable leads to the field; coordinates multi-jurisdictional investigations; and monitors investigative progress.
- The Programs Unit oversees commercial fraud and IPR priority programs. Two of these programs are Operation Guardian and Operation Apothecary. Operation Guardian focuses on substandard, tainted, or hazardous imported products, such as tainted honey, shrimp, or substandard steel, while Operation Apothecary, targets legitimate and counterfeit pharmaceuticals that are illegally sold on the internet. The Programs Unit also develops enforcement initiatives and provides investigative guidance to field components on non-IPR commercial fraud issues.
- The Outreach and Training Unit coordinates and conducts comprehensive training for domestic and international law enforcement agencies, teaching investigative best practices that broaden IPR protection and expand transnational enforcement capabilities. This Unit also conducts domestic and international industry outreach initiatives under the Center outreach program, Operation Joint Venture.

The IPR Center realizes that the best way to meet the threat posed by IPR crime is through partnership with the public and private sectors. That is why the IPR Center works with rights owners and trade associations on an ongoing basis, and that is why IPR Center personnel have already conducted outreach to over 40 trade associations and foreign governments, which provide critical assistance to federal law enforcement. And that is why we are developing a system to facilitate the intake of your leads, provide you with a tracking number, and ensure that we follow up with you concerning the status of our action on the information that you provide to us, so that you can make informed decisions concerning your rights and civil options.

Each year, private industry and organizations cooperate with law enforcement to initiate thousands of investigations and inspections, participate in hundreds of law enforcement operations, and help seize millions of dollars in counterfeit goods. These same companies and trade associations also assist with civil litigation against those engaged in IPR crimes. Private industry anti-piracy experts present expert testimony in criminal prosecutions and help organize educational and public relations campaigns to inform the public about the evils of piracy.

One example of our successful partnership was the joint investigation by ICE, the pharmaceutical industry, the United Kingdom and Chinese authorities that identified an individual who was trafficking and distributing commercial quantities of counterfeit heart, cancer, psychiatric and various lifestyle medications. As a result of the investigation, four Class 1 alerts (immediate recalls) of counterfeit Plavix, Casodex and Zyprexa were issued in the U.K. The perpetrator was convicted by a federal jury in July 2008 and is scheduled to be sentenced in December 2008.

Whether the threat is fires caused by substandard circuit breakers, exploding batteries, or fake products that tarnish your company's brand, the IPR Center is here to help eliminate that threat. Since the Center opened in July 2008, we have developed 60 leads, initiated 32 investigations, and delivered more than 80 outreach and training sessions reaching over 3,600 attendees.

We want to work with you to stop IPR criminals, and we need to hear from you. The Center's doors are open and our staff is ready to assist you. We are conveniently located near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Virginia. If you are in the area or based nearby, contact us and arrange for a visit. You can call us at 1-866-IPR-2060 or reach us via our Web page at [www.ice.gov](http://www.ice.gov).

The National IPR Coordination Center - "Protection Is Our Trademark".

*Council member Marcy M. Forman is the Director of the Office of Investigations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and oversees the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, with more than 8,000 employees to include over 6,200 Special Agents, assigned to 26 Special Agent-in-Charge offices in major cities, and 178 other field offices throughout the United States, and administers a budget of more than \$1.5 billion. As Director, Ms. Forman is responsible for strategic planning, national policy implementation, and the development and execution of operational initiatives spanning the five major investigative program divisions within the Office of Investigations: National Security Investigations; Financial, Narcotics and Public Safety Investigations; Critical Infrastructure Protection and Fraud Investigations; Investigative Services; and Policy and Emergency Preparedness.*

## **From Vanersbog, Sweden to Sudan, Pakistan and Beyond: Council member Olle Fjordgren reminisces about a life of adventure and service (cont'd from page 3)**

Sudan was quite interesting in those days, I learned very quickly to adapt to the new surroundings and survive in a quite harsh and hostile environment. I lived in Port Sudan and prospected in Sahara and Nubian Deserts. I also worked with purchasing gold sand in the northern parts of Eritrea. This might sound like a very tall story, but it is true: The local nomadic tribesmen collected the gold sand and gold dust in river beds in the spring when the heavy rains forced torrents of water to rush down the creeks and wadis, and transporting sand and debris. As gold is much heavier than ordinary sand, it kept close to the bottom. The smart herdsmen put sheep and goat hides on the bottom with the hairs pointing upstream so the gold would be trapped in the hides. After the rains, they scraped off the gold and filled empty cartridge cases with the gold. There was a desperate shortage of ammo there and almost all the tribesmen had a vintage .303 lee-Enfield rifle. So, I traded one live round for an empty brass filled with gold dust.... OK, I blush even now...

On the plane down from Europe to Khartoum, I met a young Englishman who was going to work as a road engineer outside Port Sudan. We agreed to keep in contact. After a few weeks, I wandered into the local expat hangout in Port Sudan and overheard that the young man was dead. It turned out that he had been out on the site with a local crew with a translator/foreman. The young Englishman had no training or insight in local customs and culture so when the crew stopped working to make their "salat", he was dumbfounded. He waited a few minutes, went to the foreman and asked what was going on. The foreman ignored him so he pushed him with his foot. The foreman stopped praying, rose up, took a shovel, crushed the forehead of the Englishman and continued with his prayers. There was no arrest or investigation, as it was clearly a crime against the law of the "salat". The young kid was sent home in a zinc coffin and it was all settled as an accidental death.

As I said, you must learn and learn fast...

After a few months, my boss went to San'a' in Yemen to look over his business there. I tagged along to try to find out if there were any prospecting to be done. After a week in Yemen, I took the boat back to Port Sudan. That was the most vile, terrible and unfriendly place on earth. Even though I was a Swede, they just hated me. (It was after this trip I started to carry a gun at all times.)

During the first years a Ruger Blackhawk in .357Mag kept me company, in later years a Colt 1911 in .45ACP is the main comforter. (I suspect my .45 is the most globetrotting handgun in Scandinavia!)

In the autumn, I trekked north to the border regions between Sudan and Egypt to do some prospecting for limestone to make cement and concrete. The border regions were even, in those days, a quite uncontrolled region, and the exact border lines were a matter of opinion only. The border patrols were quite nice and even nicer after a few bottles of darra, the local moonshine. I could travel at my own will in the region after half a case of the stuff. In this area, we found old mines with evidence of emerald mining in the very old days. But, with the help of modern hand-held drills and some blasting stuff, I could bring back enough rough emeralds to pay of all my tuition debts. And more!

I left Sudan when things started to turn bad in the south. I still remember one night when there was an attempted military coup in the town I stayed. I spent the whole night all alone sitting on my bed holding a M16 in my grip. If I had to go – I would not be alone. It is one thing if you are a soldier and trained and equipped for this kind of situations, but I was just a kid fresh out from university!

After a few years, I got an assignment in Beijing, China for Volvo International to look over a vast amount of gold, jewelry, and gemstones that should be part of a triangular trade deal mainly involving Volvo Penta diesels from Sweden. Quite fun to be in the "old" China before the heavy tourism took over.

Just after I returned from China, I was approached by UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). They wanted me as an Expert Advisor to the Government of Pakistan. They were going to have their first auction for emeralds and other gemstones from the North-West Frontier Province in Pakistan. I packed my bag and went. This was in 1981 and I assume that I must have been there at the same time as Usama..... No, we never met!

I worked with the Government boys to set up the auction and bidding process to make it fair and safe for all parties involved. I also visited the mining areas in Swat, Gilgit and other "romantic" places, as well as travelling all over Wasiristan. The auction went well, and all parties were satisfied. I still remember the signage in the hallway outside the gem stone exhibition hall: "Kindly leave all handguns, machineguns and daggers here. Rifles and swords are allowed" The idea was that if some Pashtun got irritated, the heavily armed guards on the balconies would take him out before he could get the rifle from the shoulder. If he had a handgun, they might not react in time. Hmm, I never saw that sign at Sotheby's or Christie's in London!

As I had lots of spare time, I told the staff at my hotel to spread out the information that if someone from the Tribal areas or Afghanistan had something very special they wanted to sell for cash without interference from tax man or others, I was very interested. After a few weeks, I was approached by a Mujahedin that claimed to have a very old, noble and expensive diamond. It sounded too good to be true, but Afghanistan is Afghanistan. I told him to meet me in my room the following evening, and I wired my company in UK to make a huge amount of cash available if needed. The Mujahedin arrived in my room – with seven others. All armed to their teeth, and there was a definite surplus of loaded AK47's. All pointed in my general direction. They presented the stone, which turned out to be just a nice piece of topaz maybe worth 50 cents. I told them the sad truth while looking rather nervously at all the AK's. They took it in the stride, said they had some really interesting pieces in their home village in Afghanistan, and invited me to come with them to the Pansheer Valley. This was in 1981. This was during the war and occupation by the Russians. I had no visa, no excuse to go there and it all sounded like a very stupid idea. So I packed my bag. We travelled on deserted roads north of the Khyber Pass at night, slept when the sun was up, and moved on in the dusk. I still react to the sights of Hind helicopters. In the end we came to their village. I was treated as visiting royalty, and I bought a lot of gemstones. It was a fair deal- they wanted \$ to buy armament, I had \$ and wanted gems. But – I was very happy to see Peshawar on the way back!

In 1982 I was appointed CEO of Gems International (Lanka) Ltd., the largest exporters of gemstones in Sri Lanka. Inger (my wife) and I moved there and lived in Colombo for a couple of years until the Tamil uprising in the north became too scary. We had some bombings in Pettah in Colombo just a few blocks from our residence.

In 1987, I was appointed COO and CSO of PABE Group in Sweden but this did not stop me from traveling.

In 1988, UNIDO asked me to be Senior Expert in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and help the local government assess some gemstone deposits in the south and establish a gem cutting laboratory in Addis. This was a very interesting assignment, but it was the only time I have felt scared and uneasy the whole time. Ethiopia in those days had a lot of "Military Advisors" from the Soviet Union, and they were very much disliked by the locals with very just causes. I might have looked a bit Russian because everywhere I heard nasty remarks, local thugs trying to bully me, kids trying to cut me, etcetera.

As we traveled up north towards Asmara, I was overwhelmed with the impact the local weed "khat" had on the inhabitants. Everyone chewed khat everywhere. It is now a rising problem in our part of Europe with intense smuggling of khat to Sweden and Norway, as we have a large number of Somalian refugees here, and most of them cannot imagine a life without khat.

In 1989, I was appointed Senior Expert to the government of Mongolia. I worked in Mongolia for three years, based in Ulan Bataar but traveled all over the country. As you know, Mongolia was the second country to turn communist (1921). It showed up in perfect detail: subdued people, lousy architecture, almost no decent food, and a hunger for outside news. I have a habit when travelling to foreign countries to bring Playboy (only for the articles!), Time, Newsweek etc. In Mongolia, they ignored Playboy and copied Time and Newsweek and spread hundreds of copies all over the place. But, the people of Mongolia are the best I have ever met! Completely loyal, trustworthy, and the best friends on the planet. I am still honorary citizen of the Omun Govvi province in southern Mongolia after a hunting trip with the local governor!

In 1992, I was appointed CEO and CSO of Svensk Pantbelaning, the largest private financing company in northern Europe. This stopped me from travelling except for conferences and vacations.

In 1994, the company did so well I had to find stronger and better owners, so I arranged the sale of the company to Cash America, Ft Worth, TX. I worked for them, running our Scandinavian operations up to 2004 when they decided to sell the company to a British investment firm I disliked.

I quit and opened up my own consulting company within the security area.

I became partner and CEO of Protection Group Sweden, the largest private company offering security training in Sweden. The training ranged from night guards to PSD for service in Iraq. In 2007, we decided to quit the life in the big city (Stockholm) and moved west. We have a summer house on my ancestral farm by the ocean and expanded the house and moved there. So now our office overlooks the fiord and the pastures with grazing cattle instead of concrete and tarmac.

I now lecture about security with focus on Terrorism, both International and Domestic, with emphasis on the motivation and background to the different movements.

I also do quite a bit of lecturing and practical work with stalking and stalking victims.

Now the company is expanding, and we have changed the name. What was formerly known as Fjordgren Konsult AB is now Granit & Kaprifol (loosely translated as Granite and Honeysuckle). Granit will be the security division and Kaprifol will be my wife's business with events for larger companies. But the company name also indicates that in all endeavors involving security and people, you need the hardness (Granite) as well as the softer human touch (Honeysuckle).